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RELIGION IN NEW YORK PUBLIC 
SCHOOLS? GOD FORBID: PROPER 
APPLICATION OF THE PUBLIC FORUM 
DOCTRINE 
Hae Jin Lee* 
INTRODUCTION 
Since 1988, federal courts in New York have struggled with 
the statutory interpretation and application of New York Education 
Law section 414 (“section 414”), which authorizes New York 
public school boards to implement regulations governing the 
community’s use of school facilities.1 Even though section 414 
authorizes the use of public school facilities by community 
residents, New York school districts have denied religious groups, 
including a wide spectrum of student groups, community groups, 
and churches, access to those facilities.2 Religious groups contend 
                                                          
 * Brooklyn Law School Class of 2004; B.A., Barnard College of Columbia 
University, 1998. The author would like to thank her loving husband, Jae Woo 
Lee and her family, Ki Woong, Jung Hee, Kwangyong David, and Beth Shim 
for their unconditional love and support. The author would also like to give 
special thanks to Karen Chang, George Barry, Pearl Christensen, and Diane 
Yang for their encouragement, Jordan Lorence and Rena Lindevaldsen for their 
invaluable expertise, and the entire editorial board of the Journal of Law and 
Policy for their insightful comments. 
1 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (enacted 1910; McKinney 2002). See language of 
the statute infra note 21 and explanation of the statute infra Part I.A. 
2 Id. See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 105 
(2001) (addressing public school’s denial of community-based Christian youth 
organization’s request to meet after school hours in school building); Lamb’s 
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 388-89 (1993) 
(addressing the school district’s denial of church’s request to use public school 
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that free speech rights protected by the First Amendment have 
been violated.3 New York school districts contend that they have 
the authority to regulate private speech.4 The Second Circuit has 
supported school districts’ policies and practices, holding that 
section 414 created only a limited public forum from which 
religious speech could be excluded.5 Twice, the United States 
Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Second Circuit’s 
decisions.6 Nonetheless, New York school districts continue to 
deny religious groups access to school facilities, which are 
otherwise open to the community.7 
                                                          
for a film series); Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y. and Cmty. 
Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 F.3d 342, 346-47 (2d Cir. 2003) (addressing, for the 
second time, the school board’s denial of congregation’s application to hold 
Sunday services in public school); Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 
No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998) 
(addressing the school board’s denial of congregation’s application to hold 
Sunday services in public school). Bronx Household of Faith brought the same 
complaint against the local school board on the ground of the new case law in 
Good News Club. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 
401, 411 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003). 
3 See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 104; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 
389; Anderson v. Mex. Acad. and Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 193, 195 
(N.D.N.Y. 2002); Saratoga Bible Training Inst. v. Schuylerville Cent. Sch. Dist., 
18 F. Supp. 2d 178, 182 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). 
4 See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395; Good News Club v. Milford 
Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 202 F.3d 502 (2d 
Cir. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Liberty Christian Ctr. Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. 
of the City Sch. Dist. of Watertown, 8 F. Supp. 2d 176, 180 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); 
Trinity United Methodist Parish v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of 
Newburgh, 907 F. Supp. 707, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 1995). See Anderson v. Mex. 
Acad. and Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196 (N.D.N.Y. 2002). 
5 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 509 (2d. Cir. 
2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d 214-15; 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 387 (2d 
Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). See infra Part I.B.1 (explaining limited 
public forum); see also infra Part III.B (discussing limited public forum). 
6 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 390. 
7 See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 403. A school 
district denied a local church access to the public school facility for the Sunday 
worship and meeting after the Supreme Court granted a Christian youth 
organization access to the public school for the weekly meetings, which 
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The Supreme Court has recognized that the Constitution’s 
protection of religious speech limits a school board’s authority to 
deny non-student groups’ access to public school facilities.8 
Religious speech is fully protected by the First Amendment of the 
Constitution.9 The Second Circuit, however, has struggled to 
reconcile religious groups’ freedom of speech in public school 
facilities with school boards’ Establishment Clause claims, which 
operate to keep religious speech out of public school facilities.10 
                                                          
consisted of singing praise songs, listening to Bible lessons, and memorizing 
verses of scripture in Good News Club. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
8 Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 384 (holding that by opening its facilities to 
other groups discussing family issues and child rearing, the school board created 
a limited public forum and could not prohibit religious groups discussion of their 
viewpoint on the subject). See Charles J. Russo & Ralph D. Mawdsley, And the 
Wall Keeps Tumbling Down: The Supreme Court Upholds Religious Liberty in 
Good News Club v. Milford Central School, 157 EDUC. L. REP. 1, 2 (2001) 
(reviewing the history of the dispute between the Second Circuit and the 
Supreme Court). 
9 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech . . . .”). See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 835 (holding that 
the University cannot justify discrimination based on viewpoint for groups 
seeking allocation of funds because of scarcity of resources); Capitol Square 
Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (reviewing 
precedent which established that private religious speech is “as fully protected 
under the Free Speech Clause as secular private expression”); Lamb’s Chapel, 
508 U.S. at 395 (holding that the school district’s denial of the use of its 
facilities for a film series sponsored by a church did not violate the 
Establishment Clause because, under the circumstances, there was little danger 
that it would appear that the films and the religion expressed within them were 
endorsed by the school district); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) 
(holding that the university policy of excluding religious groups from the 
university’s open forum policy violated the fundamental principle that a state 
regulation of speech should be content-neutral when the university failed to 
justify its exclusions with a compelling state interest). Religious worship and 
discussion “are forms of speech and association protected by the First 
Amendment.” Id. at 269. 
10 Good News Club, 202 F.3d 502; Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d 
207; Lamb’s Chapel, 959 F.2d 381. See Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of 
Educ. of the City of New York and Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 F.3d 342, 355 
(2d Cir. 2003). While upholding the lower court’s decision to grant an injunction 
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Reconciliation of these principles requires an understanding of the 
relationship between the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment 
Clause of the First Amendment.11 The competing principles 
manifest where a non-student religious group requests use of 
public school facilities.12 The Supreme Court has settled “the 
question of whether speech can be excluded from a limited public 
forum on the basis of the religious nature of the speech.”13 In Good 
News Club v. Milford Central School, the Supreme Court ruled that 
religious speech, including religious worship, should be allowed in 
a limited public forum.14 Unfortunately, even after Good News 
Club, the application of free speech doctrine to public forums 
                                                          
in favor of a local church on the Free Speech Clause ground, the Second Circuit 
also expressed its hesitation to follow the Supreme Court precedent in the future. 
Id. 
11 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech . . . .”). See Rena M. Bila, Note, The Establishment 
Clause: A Constitutional Permission Slip for Religion in Public Education, 60 
BROOK. L. REV. 1535 (1995) (examining Establishment Clause decisions and 
analyzing the defects in courts’ analysis of the Establishment Clause and their 
failure to protect the rights of the religious and nonreligious equally); Ralph D. 
Mawdsley, Religious Worship in Public School Facilities: New York’s Section 
414 and Closing the Gap between Free Speech and the Establishment Clause, 
178 EDUC. L. REP. 19, 32 (2003) (arguing that the refusal to allow the use of 
school facilities during non-school hours for religious uses when it is permitted 
for secular purposes cannot be termed anything but hostility towards religion). 
12 Good News Club, 202 F.3d 502; Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d 
207; Lamb’s Chapel, 959 F.2d 381. See Symposium, Religion and Education: 
Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 123-24 (2000) [hereinafter 
McCarthy] (discussing the transformation of Establishment Clause doctrine in 
controversies over religious speech in school). 
13 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 105. “Limited public forum” is an area of 
public property that the government has opened for limited purposes of 
expressive activity. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
U.S. 37, 45 (1983) (defining three types of forums). A few examples of a limited 
public forum are school facilities used by student clubs after school hours, 
school facilities used for school board meetings, municipal buildings used for a 
concert, and school grounds used for community groups bazaar. Id. See infra 
text accompanying notes 67-70 (explaining the concept of limited public 
forums). 
14 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 106-27. 
LEE.DOC 3/3/2004  2:37 PM 
 ENSURING FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC FORUMS 425 
remains unclear.15 Therefore, it is imperative that the public forum 
doctrine be clarified to facilitate proper application of section 414 
so as to ensure that the free speech rights of religious groups in 
New York are appropriately protected. 
This note examines the application of the public forum doctrine 
with regard to New York public school districts’ policy and 
practice of opening facilities to the community while excluding 
religious groups. Part I reviews the Free Speech Clause and the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. In addition, it 
examines the statutory interpretations of New York state law and 
the policy of the New York City Board of Education with regard to 
the public forum doctrine. Finally, it reviews the Establishment 
Clause doctrine and argues that the Establishment Clause does not 
constitute a compelling state interest for the purpose of public 
forum analysis. Part II examines the major free speech and public 
forum doctrine cases. Part III reconsiders the public forum and free 
speech analysis in light of the cases discussed in Part II. Analyzing 
the application of the public forum doctrine, four recommendations 
are presented to facilitate resolution of the recurring issue of 
prohibition of religious groups from New York public schools. 
I.  STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 
New York school districts have interpreted section 414 to 
justify an exclusion of religious groups from access to public 
                                                          
15 John E. Dunsford, A Closer Look at Good News v. Milford: What are the 
Implications? (Stay Tuned), 25 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 577, 607 (2002). 
Good News Club repeats and reinforces the earlier teaching of the 
Supreme Court in Lamb’s Chapel that when public authorities create a 
public forum of some nature, it is unconstitutional under the Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment to discriminate on the basis of 
religious viewpoint. This lesson has not been entirely welcome in some 
quarters, and its radiating implications have stirred reconsideration of 
the adequacy of past definitions of public forums, the claims of 
religious instruction and worship as protected speech interests, and the 
appropriate reach of the Establishment Clause into the realm of private 
expressions on public property. 
Id. 
LEE.DOC 3/3/2004  2:37 PM 
426 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
school facilities.16 The exclusion is codified in the New York City 
Board of Education’s Community Use Policy.17 This section 
interprets section 414 and the New York City School Board’s 
Community Use Policy.18 
In addition, the New York school districts have also used an 
Establishment Clause claim to justify their policy of excluding 
religious groups.19 This section explores the relationship between 
the Free Speech Clause and the Establishment Clause with respect 
to the protection of religious speech in public schools. 
A. New York Education Law Section 414 and New York City 
Board of Education’s Community Use Policy 
The State of New York authorizes New York public school 
boards to implement regulations governing the community’s use of 
public school facilities.20 In particular, section 414 enumerates 
                                                          
16 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 
(N.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); 
Liberty Christian Ctr. Inc. v. Bd. of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of Watertown, 8 
F. Supp. 2d 176, 180 (N.D.N.Y. 1998); Trinity United Methodist Parish v. Bd. 
of Educ. of the City Sch. Dist. of Newburgh, 907 F. Supp. 707, 712 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995). See Anderson v. Mex. Acad. and Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196 
(N.D.N.Y. 2002). 
17 Standard Operating Procedures for Schools and FMCs, EDUC. Topic 5 
(October 2001, revised) [hereinafter Community Use Policy]. 
18 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002); Community Use Policy. 
19 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .”). See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993); Deeper Life Christian 
Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676, 681 (2d Cir. 1988); Bronx 
Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), 
aff’d, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003). 
20 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002). See infra note 21 (language of 
the statute); see, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 102. New York public 
schools are traditionally nonpublic forums because they are government 
property; see also 68 AM. JUR. 2d Schools § 94 (2003). Thus, they are generally 
not open for public uses unless the state intends to open the school facilities for 
purpose of expressive activities. See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 680 (1992) (stating that “[t]he government does not create 
a [designated] public forum by inaction or by permitting limited discourse, but 
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several purposes for which local boards may permit the public to 
use school facilities outside regular school hours.21 The statute 
                                                          
only by intentionally opening a nontraditional public forum for public 
discourse”); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 264 (1981) (stating that in order 
to create a designated public forum, the state must intend to make the property 
generally available for expressive activity). 
21 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002). New York Education Law § 
414 provides the trustees or board of education of the district the control and 
supervision over the school facilities. Id. 
Use of schoolhouse and grounds. 1. Schoolhouses and the grounds 
connected therewith and all property belonging to the district shall be in 
the custody and under the control and supervision of the trustees or 
board of education of the district. The trustees or board of education 
may adopt reasonable regulations for the use of such schoolhouses, 
grounds or other property, all portions thereof, when not in use for of 
such schoolhouses, grounds or other property, opinion of the trustees or 
board of education use will not be disruptive of normal school 
operations, for such other public purposes as are herein provided; 
except, however, in the city of New York each community school 
board shall be authorized to prohibit any use of schoolhouses and 
school grounds within its district which would otherwise be permitted 
under the provisions of this §. Such regulations shall provide for the 
safety and security of the pupils and shall not conflict with the 
provisions of this chapter and shall conform to the purposes and intent 
of this § and shall be subject to review on appeal to the commissioner 
of education as provided by law. The trustees or board of education of 
each district may, subject to regulations adopted as above provided, 
permit the use of the schoolhouse and rooms therein, and the grounds 
and other property of the district, when not in use for school purposes 
or when the school is in use for school purposes if in the opinion of the 
trustees or board of education use will not be disruptive of normal 
school operations, for any of the following purposes: (a) For the 
purpose of instruction in any branch of education, learning or the arts, 
(b) For public library purposes, subject to the provisions of this chapter, 
or as stations of public libraries, (c) For holding social, civic and 
recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to 
the welfare of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and 
uses shall be non-exclusive and shall be open to the general public, (d) 
For meetings, entertainments and occasions where admission fees are 
charged, when the proceeds thereof are to be expended for an 
educational or charitable purpose; but such use shall not be permitted if 
such meetings, entertainments and occasions are under the exclusive 
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provides for non-student groups from the community to use school 
facilities for various purposes.22 The statute allows for broad uses 
such as “instruction in any branch of education, learning or the 
arts.”23 The statute’s language, that schools may be used for 
“social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments and 
other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community,” suggests a 
broad legislative intent.24 Specifically, section 414 does not contain 
any explicit language denying religious clubs or other religious 
groups access to public school facilities, nor does it explicitly 
make the enumerated purposes exclusive.25 Section 414 also does 
not specify which groups may take advantage of the opportunity to 
conduct “social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainments 
[or] other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community,” nor 
does it bar certain groups from such uses.26 
Although the statute gives the Board of Education the 
discretion to prohibit some uses, this discretion is not without 
limit: section 414 is bound by the Constitution, which does not 
allow a categorical exclusion of all religious groups.27 New York 
                                                          
control and the said proceeds are to be applied for the benefit of a 
society, association or organization of a religious sect or denomination, 
or of a fraternal, secret or exclusive society or organization other than 
organizations of veterans of the military, naval and marine service of 
the Untied States and organizations of volunteer firefighters or 
volunteer ambulance workers . . . (f) For civic forums and community 
centers . . . . 
Id. 
22 Id. 
23 § 414.1(a) (emphasis added). 
24 § 414.1(c) (emphasis added). 
25 See § 414; see also supra note 21 (language of the statute). 
26 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414.1 (McKinney 2002) (emphasis added). 
27 U.S. CONST. amend. I; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002). New 
York public school boards and the Second Circuit have treated all religious 
groups equally—as they relate to each other—and claim that they comply with 
the Constitution by excluding all religious groups. See, e.g., Good News Club v. 
Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2d. Cir. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); 
Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 
1997); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d 
Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Bd. 
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public school districts, however, have made three kinds of 
arguments from the language of section 414 to justify a bar to 
religious groups’ access to school facilities: (1) Religious purposes 
are not included in section 414’s enumerated list of permitted 
uses;28 (2) Subparagraph (d) specifically prohibits use by religious 
                                                          
of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1988). As this note will argue, however, 
this categorical exclusion does not satisfy the Constitution. See discussion infra 
Part III.D (proposing that New York’s Community Use Policy should be struck 
down as facially unconstitutional because it categorically singles out religious 
speech from a public forum); cf. Christopher P. Coval, Student Symposium, 
Good News for Religious Schools and the Freedom of Speech, 83. B.U. L. REV. 
705, 706 (2003) (agreeing with the Supreme Court’s interpretation that a 
“categorical exclusion of religious schools from voucher programs in which 
private, secular schools are entitled to participate violate[s] the Free Speech 
Clause” of the Constitution); Rebecca G. Rees, Note, If We Recant, Would We 
Qualify?: Exclusion of Religious Providers from State Social Service Voucher 
Programs, 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1291, 1338 (1999) (arguing that “[a] 
categorical exclusion of all religious social service providers from state voucher 
programs” would convey the message that those providers are collectively 
“inferior by nature of their religious viewpoint” regardless of the characteristics 
or contents of their religious viewpoint). Even if school voucher programs 
constitute limited public forums, such a categorical exclusion of religious 
schools, “simply because they are religious,” violates the Constitution. Coval, 
supra, at 706. If all religious social service providers are collectively excluded 
from state voucher programs, “when all others are eligible,” then it effectively 
creates a class of outsiders to the program in violation of the Constitution. Rees, 
supra, at 1338. 
28 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) 
(banning a community-based Christian youth organization from holding a 
weekly meeting on the school facilities on the ground that the New York 
Education Law § 414 did not list religious purposes for which a school may be 
used); Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 215 (prohibiting a church from 
holding a Sunday worship service and fellowship meeting on the ground that 
New York Education Law § 414 did not allow religious purposes for which a 
school may be used); Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 678 
(denying a church access to school facilities to exhibit a film series portraying 
family and child-rearing issues for public viewing on the ground that the New 
York Education Law § 414 did not enumerate religious purposes for which a 
school may be used); Trietley v. Bd. of Educ. of Buffalo, 65 A.D.2d 1, 5-6 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1978) (prohibiting a student Bible club from meeting on school 
premises on the ground that the New York Education Law § 414 did not include 
religious purposes in the enumerated purposes for which a school may be used). 
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groups;29 and (3) school boards have preserved school facilities as 
limited public forums available only to non-religious speech by 
establishing the policy and practice not to ever open the forum to 
religious groups or to close the forum to religious groups, which 
used to be available to them.30 
The only place where section 414 explicitly mentions the term 
“association or organization of a religious sect or denomination” is 
under subparagraph (d).31 Contrary to the school districts’ 
argument, the language of the statute only prohibits religious 
groups in settings where admission fees are charged; it does not 
categorically exclude religious meetings.32 Thus, subparagraph (d) 
refers to commercial activities, whose proceeds are applied for 
purposes other than educational or charitable purposes.33 
Subparagraph (d) reflects intent to maintain the integrity of the 
public forum by preventing profit-seekers from usurping the public 
forum. If activities or meetings by a religious sect require an 
admission to cover the overhead cost and/or to make profits, the 
school board can invoke subparagraph (d) to restrict access.34 The 
religious groups and churches that have brought free speech 
                                                          
29 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 678. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW 
§ 414.1(d) (McKinney 2002). 
For meetings, entertainments and occasions where admission fees are 
charged, when the proceeds thereof are to be expended for an 
educational or charitable purpose; but such use shall not be permitted if 
such meetings, entertainments and occasions are under the exclusive 
control and the said proceeds are to be applied for the benefit of a 
society, association or organization of a religious sect or 
denomination . . . . 
Id. 
30 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107 n.2. 
31 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414.1(d) (McKinney 2002). 
32 § 414.1. 
33 § 414.1(d). Generally, only those groups that apply the proceeds of their 
functions to educational or charitable purposes are considered public charities. 
26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(3); 26 U.S.C. § 170. See generally 51 A.L.R. 2d 1290 (1957) 
(“One of the distinguishing features of a public charity is that it confers its 
benefits on the public at large, or some portion thereof, or upon an indefinite 
class of persons . . . .”). 
34 Id. 
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claims, however, do not charge admission fees and, consequently, 
are not governed by the subparagraph (d).35 
Pursuant to section 414, the Board of Education instituted a 
“Community Use Policy,” which governs the use of school 
facilities in its jurisdiction.36 Each school district within the Board 
of Education may elect to adopt it.37 The Community Use Policy 
has been used as a basis for school districts to deny religious 
groups use of public school facilities outside regular school 
                                                          
35 See, e.g., Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 107 n.2; Deeper Life Christian 
Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 678; Trietley, 65 A.D.2d at 5-6. 
36 See Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 
210 (2d Cir. 1997). 
37 Community Use Policy. This policy is entitled “Standard Operating 
Procedures: Topic 5: Regulations Governing the Extended Use of School 
Facilities” and is also called “Community Use Policy.” Id. 
Applicants are responsible for adhering to all applicable provisions of 
this chapter, including the regulations set forth below . . . . 5.2. The use 
of school facilities must be in accordance with federal law, New York 
State law, local law and Board of Education policies. 5.3. The primary 
use of school premises must be for Board of Education programs and 
activities . . . . 5.5. After Board of Education programs and activities, 
preference will be given to use of school premises for community, 
youth and adult group activities. 5.6. In addition to the use described in 
items 2.11, 5.3. and 5.5, school premises may also be used for the 
following purposes: 5.6.1. For the purpose of instruction in any branch 
of education, learning or the arts; examinations; graduations; 5.6.2. For 
holding social, civic and recreational meetings and entertainment, and 
other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community; but such uses 
shall be non-exclusive and open to the general public; 5.6.3. For polling 
places for holding primaries, elections and special elections for the 
registration of voters; 5.6.4. For conducting candidate forums, provided 
all candidates are invited to participate. Permit applications for such 
forums must include a written representation that all candidates have 
been invited to participate. Once approved by the school and the 
superintendent, the Permit must be submitted to the Office of 
Community School District Affairs for approval; 5.6.5. For civic 
forums and community centers in accordance with applicable law; 
5.6.6. For recreation, physical training and athletics, including 
competitive athletic contests of children attending nonpublic, nonprofit 
schools; and 5.6.7. For such other uses as may be authorized by law. 
Id. 
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hours.38 School boards adopted a list of permitted uses of school 
facilities, including any kind of meeting related to the welfare of 
the community.39 Section 5.11 of the Community Use Policy 
states: 
[N]o outside organization or group may be allowed to 
conduct religious services or religious instruction on school 
premises after school. However, the use of school premises 
by outside organizations or groups after school for the 
purpose of discussing religious material or material which 
contains a religious viewpoint or for distributing such 
material is permissible.40 
The Community Use Policy would exclude from school 
premises any religiously-motivated group on the basis of the 
content of their speech.41 With the Community Use Policy, school 
boards have created a forum for expressive activities related to 
learning and welfare of the community, and have defined learning 
and welfare to exclude activities by religious groups such as 
religious services and instruction.42 School districts have attempted 
to distinguish between “verbal acts of worship and other verbal 
acts.”43 The Supreme Court, however, noted three difficulties with 
any attempt to distinguish between protected religious speech and 
a new class of religious speech activity that constitutes worship: 
(1) lack of “intelligible content,” because activities such as singing 
religious songs, reading religious doctrines and studying religious 
principles are all forms of speech and do not “become unprotected 
                                                          
38 See Good News Club, 202 F.3d 502; Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. 
Sch. Dist. No. 10, 1996 WL 700915 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 127 F.3d 207 (2d 
Cir. 1997); see also Community Use Policy, supra note 37. “No outside 
organization or group may be allowed to conduct religious services or religious 
instruction on school premises after school.” Id. 
39 Bronx Household of Faith, 1996 WL 700915 at *1. 
40 Community Use Policy § 5.11. 
41 Dunsford, supra note 15, at 591-92. 
42 Community Use Policy, supra note 37. 
43 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 284-87 (1981) (White, J., 
dissenting). Justice White’s dissent in Widmar parallels the school districts’ 
argument distinguishing worship from other forms of speech by religious 
groups. Id. 
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worship” despite their religious subject matter;44 (2) lack of 
judicial expertise to administer the distinction because of diversity 
of faiths and circumstances; and (3) no purpose for the different 
treatment “for religious speech designed to win religious converts 
than for religious worship by persons already converted.”45 Thus, 
attempts to single out forms of speech constituting worship from 
other forms of religious speech results in hostility toward 
religion.46 
B.  First Amendment Rights 
The First Amendment of the Constitution of the United States 
contains two clauses that relate to religious speech in a public 
                                                          
44 Id. at 270 n.6. 
45 Id. See Jay Alan Sekulow, James Henderson & John Tuskey, Proposed 
Guidelines for Student Religious Speech and Observance in Public Schools, 46 
MERCER L. REV. 1017, 1018 (1995) (arguing that the government and public 
school officials should “treat religious speech” the same as it treats other types 
of private speech). 
46 Some Supreme Court Justices would agree that New York School Board 
of Education’s Community Use Policy results in hostility rather than neutrality. 
E.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845 
(1995) (reviewing the university’s regulation to deny the right of free speech of 
student publications containing religious viewpoints, Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion stated, “[t]he viewpoint discrimination inherent in the University’s 
regulation required public officials to scan and interpret student publications to 
discern their underlying philosophic assumptions respecting religious theory and 
belief . . . [and] would risk fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, 
which could undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires”); 
Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 (1990) 
(reviewing the school board’s prohibition of religious meetings on school 
premises, Justice O’Connor’s majority opinion observed, “if a State refuse[s] to 
let religious groups use facilities open to others, then it would demonstrate not 
neutrality but hostility toward religion”); see also Dunsford, supra note 15, at 
592 (pointing out that if taken literally, the New York school district policy 
“would seem pointedly hostile toward religion”); Russo & Mawdsley, supra 
note 8, at 13 (reflecting on the Supreme Court’s response to the Second Circuit 
in Good News Club that “rejected the Second Circuit’s suggestion that the 
principle prohibiting hostility toward religion undergirding the Equal Access 
Act does not appear to extend to after-school religious groups under the Free 
Speech and the Establishment Clause”). 
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forum: the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause.47 
The Supreme Court has examined the tension between these 
clauses and determined they complement each other in protecting 
individual freedom of religion and speech.48 
1. Free Speech Clause and Public Forum Doctrine 
The First Amendment guarantees every individual the 
fundamental right to speak and express thoughts and ideas on 
public property.49 The government may regulate individuals’ free 
                                                          
47 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging 
the freedom of speech . . . .”). Discussion of the Free Exercise Clause is 
deliberately omitted from this note to focus on the public forum doctrine 
analysis in light of the Free Speech Clause. Nonetheless, the Free Exercise 
Clause of the First Amendment is another valid support for the religious speech 
on the public forum. See Paul J. Batista, Balancing the First Amendment’s 
Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses: A Rebuttal to Alexander & 
Alexander, 12 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 87 (2002) (commenting that the 
Supreme Court and other federal courts have properly reaffirmed that the First 
Amendment guarantees and protects students’ freedom to engage in religious 
activities in the public schools); Bila, supra note 11, at 1597-98 (discussing the 
balancing of competing concerns between the Free Exercise and Establishment 
Clauses of the First Amendment); Recent Development, Tearing Down the 
Wall: Rosenberger v. Rector of the University of Virginia, 19 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 587, 594 n.57 (1996) (“The Supreme Court has refused to define the 
‘centrality’ of worship activities in the Free Exercise context because such a 
definition would entail too great an examination into the tenets of particular 
religions.”). 
48 Mergens, 496 U.S. at 250. “[T]here is a crucial difference between 
government speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, 
and private speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise 
Clauses protect.” Id. See Mawdsley, supra note 11, at 33 (stating the gap 
between the Free Speech Clause and Establishment Clause has been closed by 
the recognition that religious worship can be protected by the Free Speech 
Clause in limited public forums). 
49 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the 
freedom of speech . . . .”). See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 16-17 
(1971) (reversing a California court’s conviction based on written words on a 
jacket protesting the draft on the grounds of free speech); Tinker v. Des Moines 
Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 508 (1969) (explaining that fear or 
LEE.DOC 3/3/2004  2:37 PM 
 ENSURING FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC FORUMS 435 
speech rights only if it shows “that its regulation is necessary to 
serve a compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to 
achieve that end.”50 
Traditionally, a three-prong analysis applies to an alleged 
violation of the First Amendment right of free speech: (1) whether 
the speech at issue is protected; (2) whether the forum at issue is a 
public forum; and (3) whether restrictions imposed upon the 
speech are appropriate to a particular forum.51 The three prongs of 
the free speech analysis have been disputed by religious groups 
seeking to utilize school district facilities and the New York public 
school districts that bar such use.52 Disputes over the second and 
the third prongs are still unsettled.53 
To prove a violation of religious groups’ free speech rights, 
                                                          
apprehension of disturbance due to passive expression of opinion by the wearing 
of armbands “is not enough to overcome the right to freedom of expression”). 
The free speech right includes non-verbal expression such as wearing black 
armbands as an anti-war expression and writing certain statements on a jacket. 
Id. See also Richard J. Ansson, Jr., Drawing Lines in the Shifting Sand: Where 
Should the Establishment Wall Stand? Recent Developments in Establishment 
Clause Theory: Accommodation, State Action, the Public Forum, and Private 
Religious Speech, 8 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 1, 4 (1998) (“Private 
individuals . . . do have a First Amendment guarantee to speak on government 
property that has been denoted as a public forum . . . . “). 
50 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 
(1983) (delineating three types of forums and establishing the public forum 
doctrine). See Ansson, supra note 49, at 4 (discussing that the First Amendment 
guarantees private individuals freedom of speech on government property unless 
the government can show a compelling state interest). 
51 U.S. CONST. amend. I; Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. 
Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 797-800 (1985); Perry, 460 U.S. at 44-45. See 
generally 174 A.L.R. FED. 407 (2001) (discussing the First Amendment 
principles that analyze the issues of free speech rights on the public school 
facilities). 
52 See, e.g., Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502 (2d. Cir. 
2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 
No. 10, 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); 
Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 
1988). 
53 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Edu. of the City of New York and 
Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 F.3d 342, 355 (2d Cir. 2003). 
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religious speech must be protected speech.54 Religious speech is 
protected speech in a variety of contexts.55 In resolving the tension 
between the Establishment Clause and the Free Speech Clause, the 
Supreme Court declared that discrimination against private 
religious speech and speakers “demonstrate[s] not neutrality but 
hostility toward religion.”56 This is so because permitting a private 
individual’s religious speech in a public forum does not constitute 
governmental endorsement of religion in violation of the First 
                                                          
54 See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 835 (1995) (holding that the state university violated the Free Speech 
Clause when it denied funds for an organization, which published magazines 
from a religious editorial viewpoint); Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. 
v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (holding that the state did not violate the 
Establishment Clause by permitting a private party to display an unattended 
cross on the ground of the state capitol); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 395 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 
267 (1981). Religious worship and discussion “are forms of speech and 
association protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 269. 
55 See, e.g., Lee v. Iskcon, 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (per curiam) (distribution of 
religious literature in airport terminals); Bd. of Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for 
Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (same); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 
(1953) (religious speech in a public park); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 
(1951) (street preaching); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (same); 
March v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (distribution of religious literature in a 
company town); Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943) (distribution of 
religious literature in public places); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 
(1943) (door-to-door religious canvassing). 
56 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 248 
(1990) (invalidating the public secondary school’s Establishment Clause claim 
when the school denied the students’ request to form a Christian club, which 
would have the same privileges and requirements as other student groups). See 
McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 641 (1978) (Brennan, J., concurring in the 
judgment). But see Widmar, 454 U.S. at 285-86 (White, J., dissenting). Justice 
White, the only dissenter, rejected the majority’s free speech analysis by 
criticizing the majority’s proposition that religious worship is like any other 
protected speech. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 285-86. He argued the importance of 
distinguishing between “verbal acts of worship and other verbal acts” in order to 
avoid the result that might force the majority to uphold the university’s right to 
“offer a class entitled ‘Sunday Mass’ . . . indistinguishable from a class entitled 
‘The History of the Catholic Church.’” Id. This argument does not meet the 
constitutional standard. 
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Amendment.57 
The public forum doctrine determines the existence of a right 
of access to public property for expressive activities and sets 
standards to evaluate governmental regulations of such activities.58 
The public forum doctrine developed because the First 
Amendment cannot practically guarantee every individual an 
absolute right to speak on publicly owned property.59 In Perry 
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’ Association, the 
Supreme Court delineated three types of forums: the traditional 
public forum, the nonpublic forum and the designated public 
forum.60 The “quintessential public forum[s]” or traditional public 
forums are spaces that “by long tradition or by government fiat 
have been devoted to assembly and debate.”61 In a traditional 
public forum, the government’s ability to restrict expressive 
activity is extremely limited because the government must show 
                                                          
57 See Alan E. Brownstein, Prayer and Religious Expression at High 
School Graduations: Constitutional Etiquette in a Pluralistic Society, 5-FALL 
NEXUS 61, 74 (2000) (asserting that public forums, whether traditional or 
designated, “where numerous private speakers are provided access for 
expressive activities of all kinds under neutral criteria is the paradigm example 
of public property where the religious speech of private individuals does not 
constitute an unconstitutional endorsement of religion”). 
58 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 39 
(1983). In Perry, a rival union brought an action challenging a provision in the 
collective bargaining agreement between the school district and its union, 
granting the union exclusive access to teachers’ mailboxes and the interschool 
mail system. Id. 
59 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 
799-800 (1985). 
60 Perry, 460 U.S. at 44-47. See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 
523 U.S. 666, 677-78 (1998) (reaffirming the public forum doctrine stated in 
Cornelius and Perry); Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 800-02 (reaffirming the three kinds 
of forums identified in Perry). See generally 174 A.L.R. FED. 407 (2001) 
(discussing the three-prong free speech analysis and three different types of 
forums). 
61 Perry, 460 U.S. at 44-45. These include streets and parks that have 
traditionally been used for the use of the public and for purposes of assembly, 
communicating ideas, and discussing public questions. Id. See also Cornelius, 
473 U.S. at 800 (“[A] principal purpose of traditional public for[rums] is the free 
exchange of ideas . . . .”). 
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that the restriction is narrowly drawn to achieve a compelling state 
interest.62 The government may regulate the time, place and 
manner of expression only if the regulations are content-neutral, 
narrowly tailored to achieve a compelling government interest and 
provide sufficient alternative means of communication.63 
Nonpublic forums are spaces which are not, “by tradition or 
designation,” spaces for the general public’s expressive activities.64 
In such spaces, the government has broader authority to restrict 
private individuals’ expressive activity because the state is 
considered a private property owner that controls the forum for its 
lawfully reserved use.65 The standard of review in a nonpublic 
forum is reasonableness and viewpoint neutrality.66 
A designated public forum is an area of public property that the 
                                                          
62 Perry, 460 U.S. at 44-45 (“For the state to enforce a content-based 
exclusion it must show that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling 
state interest and that it is narrowly drawn to achieve that end.”). See Carvey v. 
Brown, 447 U.S. 445, 461-62 (1980) (“When government regulation 
discriminates among speech-related activities in a public forum, the Equal 
Protection Clause mandates that the legislation be finely tailored to serve 
substantial state interests, and the justifications offered for any distinctions it 
draws must be carefully scrutinized.”). 
63 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Public Service 
Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 535-37 (1980) (holding that government could not 
prohibit inserts which advocated the use of nuclear power for the purpose of 
protecting the privacy of utility customers); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 
U.S. 104, 115 (1972) (concluding that the government failed to show a 
compelling interest to justify the antipicketing ordinance in front of a school); 
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304-07 (1940) (concluding that the state 
statute violated the First Amendment when the statute empowered a state 
authority “to determine whether the cause [of solicitation] is a religious one” and 
to grant a permit for solicitation of aid for religious views upon his 
determination). 
64 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46-47 (including the school mailboxes and interschool 
delivery facilities, which are intended for secure communication with teachers, 
not for the use by the general public). 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 46. “In addition to time, place, and manner regulations, the state 
may reserve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or otherwise, as 
long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress 
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker’s view.” Id. 
LEE.DOC 3/3/2004  2:37 PM 
 ENSURING FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC FORUMS 439 
government has opened to the public for purposes of expressive 
activity.67 “The Constitution forbids a state to enforce certain 
exclusions in a forum generally open to the public even if it was 
not required to open the forum in the first place.”68 A public forum 
that is “created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups 
[like students groups] or for the discussion of certain subjects [like 
school board business]” is a designated forum.69 Courts have 
referred to this kind of designated public forum as a “limited” 
public forum.70 Whether the state intended to open the premises for 
expressive activity can be ascertained by examining the policy and 
practice of the government.71 A designated public forum is 
established when the state allows “general access for a class of 
speakers” rather than “selective access for individual speakers.”72 
In designated public forums, similar to traditional public forums, 
                                                          
67 Id. at 45. 
68 Id. See, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (discussing 
whether a student-run Christian group could use university meeting facilities); 
City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. v. Wis. Employment Relations Comm’n, 429 
U.S. 167 (1976) (addressing the issue of non-union representatives using a 
school board meeting as a forum); Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 
U.S. 546 (1975) (concerning the use of a municipal theater). 
69 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. See Int’l Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. 
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 (1992). A designated public forum is property that the 
government has “opened for expressive activity by part or all of the public.” Id. 
“[T]he government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction” nor 
by permitting access by the public, but only by “intentionally opening a 
nontraditional public forum for public discourse.” Id. at 680 (quoting Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)). If the 
government excludes a private speaker who falls within the class to which a 
designated public forum is made available, its exclusionary action is subject to 
strict scrutiny. Id. at 679. See also United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-
27 (1990) (stressing that government-owned property is not de facto property 
open to use as a public forum). 
70 See infra notes 232-35 and accompanying text; see also discussion of a 
“limited” public forum infra Part III.B-C. 
71 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
72 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998); 
Widmar, 454 U.S. at 264. To create a designated public forum, the state must 
intend to make the property generally available for expressive activity. Id. 
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strict scrutiny applies.73 Thus, the power of the state to restrict 
expressive activity is extremely limited.74 
2. Establishment Clause Doctrine 
School districts have defended their policy of excluding 
religious groups from school facilities by reference to the 
Establishment Clause.75 The districts argue that a school would 
violate the Establishment Clause if it granted a religious group’s 
application to use school facilities because the Establishment 
Clause requires it to censor religious speech from the school 
premises.76 The Supreme Court has, however, consistently rejected 
                                                          
73 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. 
Although a state is not required to indefinitely retain the open character 
of the facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as 
apply in a traditional public forum. Reasonable time, place and manner 
regulations are permissible, and a content-based prohibition must be 
narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest. 
Id. (internal citations omitted). 
74 Id.; Kokinda, 497 U.S. at 726-27 (per curiam). “If the government 
excludes a speaker who falls within the class to which a designated public forum 
is made generally available, its action is subject to strict scrutiny.” Id. 
75 U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an 
establishment of religion . . . .”). See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches 
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993); Deeper Life Christian 
Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676, 681 (2d Cir. 1988); Bronx 
Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401, 425 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), 
aff’d, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003). 
76 E.g., Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394 (discussing that the school district 
objected to church’s use of school “on the ground that to permit its property to 
be used for religious purposes would be an establishment of religion forbidden 
by the First Amendment”); Hsu v. Roslyn Union Free Sch. Dist. 85 F.3d 839, 
867 (2d Cir. 1996) (denying to recognize a student religious club by arguing that 
if there is an internal dispute within a club, then the school would have to 
mediate the dispute, which would constitute excessive government entanglement 
with religion); Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 681 (contending 
that granting a religious group access to school facilities “will have the primary 
effect of advancing religion and will also foster excessive government 
entanglement with religion”); Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 425 
(contending that a religious group’s meeting on Sunday would so dominate the 
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the Establishment Clause defense in free speech and public forum 
doctrine cases.77 The school districts, though, continue to claim 
Establishment Clause defenses.78 
The relationship between government and religion is 
controversial.79 Courts often require governmental neutrality 
toward religion under the First Amendment; however, “neutrality” 
is a legal term of art that has never been adequately or practically 
defined.80 In the first major Establishment Clause decision, 
Everson v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court reviewed the 
history of the First Amendment and concluded that the 
                                                          
school facilities that the students would perceive it as endorsement of a 
particular religion by the school). 
77 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 105 (2001) 
(rejecting the Establishment Clause defense); Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395. 
We have no more trouble than did the Widmar Court in disposing of 
the claimed defense on the ground that the posited fears of an 
Establishment Clause violation are unfounded. The showing of this 
film series would not have been during school hours, would not have 
been sponsored by the school, and would have been open to the public, 
not just to church members. The District property had repeatedly been 
used by a wide variety of private organizations. Under these 
circumstances, as in Widmar, there would have been no realistic danger 
that the community would think that the District was endorsing religion 
or any particular creed, and any benefit to religion or to the Church 
would have been no more than incidental. 
Id. 
78 See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 425, Anderson v. 
Mex. Acad. and Cent. Sch., 186 F. Supp. 2d 193, 205-06 (N.D.N.Y. 2002); 
Saratoga Bible Training Inst. v. Schuylerville Cent. Sch. Dist., 18 F. Supp. 2d 
178, 186 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). 
79 McCarthy, supra note 12, at 123-24 (determining the governmental 
relationship with religion has generated substantial controversy in our nation). 
This may be in part because the Framers’ original intent cannot be ascertained. 
Id. at 123. 
80 See McCarthy, supra note 12, at 123-24 (stating that “neutrality” has 
never been defined); John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in 
Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 84 (1986) (stating that 
the Supreme Court has never offered a rigid definition of “neutrality,” and in 
fact, opposing justices have claimed neutrality as the basis for conflicting 
opinions). See cases cited supra notes 3-4. 
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Establishment Clause means: 
Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a 
church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid 
all religions, or prefer one religion over another . . . . No 
person can be punished for entertaining or professing 
religious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance . . . . Neither a state nor the Federal Government 
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any 
religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the 
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of 
religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of separation 
between church and state.’81 
The separation between church and state has been supported by 
several rationales, including “protecting churches against coercive 
government authority, protecting government autonomy from 
                                                          
81 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947) (citing Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)). See ROBERT M. HEALEY, JEFFERSON ON 
RELIGION IN PUBLIC EDUCATION, 128-40 (David Horne, ed., 1962); McCarthy, 
supra note 12, at 126 n.25; James E. M. Craig, Comment, “In God We Trust,” 
Unless We Are a Public Elementary School: Making a Case for Extending Equal 
Access To Elementary Education, 36 IDAHO L. REV. 529, 532 (2000) (stating 
that it is commonly assumed today that the Constitution requires a ‘wall of 
separation between church and state’). However, it should be noted that this 
metaphor of “a wall of separation between church and state” is not found in the 
Constitution but found in a statement made by Thomas Jefferson in 1802 in a 
letter refusing a Baptist association’s request for a day to be established for 
fasting and prayer in thanksgiving for the nation’s welfare. Id. This is a simple 
note written fourteen years after the enactment of the Bill of Rights. Id. As a 
matter of fact, Jefferson did not participate in drafting the Bill of Rights because 
he was out of the country at the time of drafting. Craig, supra, at 532 (citing 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91-92 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)). 
Jefferson wrote the note because he did not want to authorize a statewide 
‘Baptist Association’s Day’ for all state residents to observe regardless of their 
religious beliefs. HEALEY, supra, at 128-40. His statement cannot reflect the 
intent of the Framers and the meaning of the Establishment Clause and Free 
Speech Clause of the First Amendment. Id. See also Wallace, 472 U.S. at 106-
07 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist criticized the use of the 
metaphor and said that the wall “is a metaphor based on bad history, a metaphor 
which has proved useless as a guide to judging. It should be frankly and 
explicitly abandoned.” Id. at 107 
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undue sectarian influences, and protecting the independence of 
both religious and government enterprises.”82 
Establishment Clause doctrine has dramatically shifted from 
banning religious speech from government forums to barring 
prohibition against religious speech on school premises.83 In 1981, 
in Widmar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court found no Establishment 
Clause violation when it struck down a prohibition on student 
religious groups’ access to a designated public forum at a state 
university.84 In 1990, the Court acknowledged “a crucial difference 
                                                          
82 McCarthy, supra note 12, at 126-27. See also John M. Bagyi, Note, 
Board of Education of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet: Misconstruing the Status Quo as a 
Neutral Baseline, 60 ALB L. REV. 541, 545 (1996) (discussing five trends 
which attempt to achieve a balance between the Establishment Clause and the 
Free Exercise Clause: separation, nonendorsement, accommodation, coercion, 
and neutrality); Bila, supra note 11, at 1535-44 (noting that in spite of the goals 
of the Establishment Clause to limit the intermingling of government and 
religion, the Supreme Court has been inconsistent in defining the parameters of 
the Clause); Symposium, Religious Liberty as Liberty, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL 
ISSUES 313, 319 (1996) (emphasizing that the most powerful reason for the 
separation of government and religion is to prevent religion from invoking the 
government’s coercive power and to prevent the government from being able to 
coerce any religious act or belief). 
83 See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 103 (2001); 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 392-97 
(1993); see also McCarthy, supra note 12, at 131. Elementary school districts 
have attempted to use Establishment Clause defenses. Good News Club, 533 
U.S. at 100. They claim that the school districts’ policy should be upheld to 
protect the integrity of the Establishment Clause because it involved 
impressionable children, who might perceive that the school was endorsing the 
religion when meetings were on school premises and also might feel compelled 
to attend them. Id. at 114-20. However, this claim has been rejected by the 
Supreme Court, which reasoned that allowing religious groups on school 
premises ensured neutrality toward religion. Id. See also Russo & Mawdsley, 
supra note 8, at 13 (agreeing with the Supreme Court’s response to the Second 
Circuit in Good News Club that “rejected the Second Circuit’s suggestion that 
the principle prohibiting hostility toward religion undergirding the Equal Access 
Act does not appear to extend to after-school religious groups under the Free 
Speech and the Establishment Clause”). 
84 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (holding that the university 
policy of excluding religious groups from the university’s open forum policy 
violated the fundamental principle that state regulation of speech should be 
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between government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing 
religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses 
protect.”85 Subsequently, the Court found no Establishment Clause 
violation in allowing a church to have access to a public school.86 
The church was addressing certain topics from religious 
perspectives, and the activities “would not have been during school 
hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and would 
have been open to the public, not just to church members.”87 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has rejected the idea that the 
Constitution requires the government, in a public forum, to permit 
religious speech but prohibit religious worship in a public forum.88 
                                                          
content-neutral when the university failed to justify its exclusions with a 
compelling state interest). The Supreme Court concluded that the university had 
established an open forum and therefore, any restriction of religious speech on 
campus must be supported by a compelling state interest. Id. at 267-70. All 
members of a registered religious group at a state university brought an action, 
challenging the university’s policy and claiming violation of the First 
Amendment. Id. at 265-66. University facilities were generally available for 
activities of university student groups. Id. at 265. The university, however, 
adopted a regulation prohibiting the use of university facilities for purposes of 
religious worship or religious teaching. Id. Finding the university to be an 
established open forum, the Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit, holding that the university regulation is an 
unconstitutional content-based discrimination against religious speech and that 
the Establishment Clause does not justify the discrimination. Id. at 277. 
85 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 
(1990). 
86 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 105; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395. See 
J. Kevin Jenkins, Equal Access to Public School Facilities by Religious and 
Other Non-Curricular Groups, 170 ED. LAW. REP. 439, 455 (2002) (noting that 
the Establishment Clause defense is unavailing in “use of facilities” cases before 
the Court). 
87 Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395. 
88 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269 n.6. The Supreme Court summarized the 
invalidity of the school district’s argument in Capitol Square Review Board v. 
Pinnette: “[I]ndeed, in Anglo-American history, at least, government 
suppression of speech has so commonly been directed precisely at religious 
speech that a Free Speech Clause without religion would be Hamlet without the 
prince. Accordingly, we have not excluded from free-speech protections 
religious proselytizing, or even acts of worship” (citations omitted). Capitol 
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II.  PUBLIC FORUM DOCTRINE 
The Supreme Court and the Second Circuit have reconciled 
their differences with respect to the public forum doctrine 
analysis.89 Nonetheless, understanding the differences is 
instructive. This section presents examples of the different 
approaches to the question of whether religious speech is 
permissible on school premises. The Second Circuit created a new 
category of speech by treating religious groups collectively 
regardless of the subject matter of their speech.90 In its 
examination of the Second Circuit’s analysis, the Supreme Court 
rebuked the appellate court for allowing the school district to limit 
speech in a way it determined was a violation of religious groups’ 
freedom of speech.91 
A.  Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Board of Education of 
the City of New York 
In 1988, the Second Circuit decided its first free speech and 
public forum case, Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Board of 
Education of the City of New York.92 The Deeper Life Christian 
Fellowship (“Deeper Life”), a Christian church, was granted a 
permit to use an elementary school building in District 27 in 
Queens on four consecutive Sundays.93 When Deeper Life applied 
for renewal of its permit, the school board denied the application 
                                                          
Square Review Board v. Pinnette, 515 U.S. 753, 760 (1995) (citing Widmar, 454 
U.S. at 269 n.6). See supra Part I.B.2 (explaining the Establishment Clause). 
89 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York and 
Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 F.3d 342, 357 (2d Cir. 2003). 
90 See supra note 27 and accompanying text; see also discussion infra Part 
III.D. 
91 See infra text accompanying note 176. 
92 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1988). Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, plaintiff 
and appellee, is a nonprofit corporation and a Christian church in Richmond 
Hill, New York within the public school district overseen by defendant and 
appellant, District 27 Community School Board. Id. at 677. See supra Part I.A.1 
(discussing the standards of review). 
93 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 677. 
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on the ground that the Deeper Life’s activities, which included 
worship services, children’s church services and a Sunday school 
at the public school, violated New York State Education Law 
section 414, especially subparagraph (d).94 Deeper Life brought a 
claim against the school board alleging that the school board’s 
denial was an unconstitutional prohibition of free speech.95 
Relying on Widmar v. Vincent, the district court granted a 
preliminary injunction in favor of Deeper Life.96 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the injunction, but with 
erroneous reasoning.97 Unlike Widmar, the Second Circuit’s 
holding was not because the school facility was a public forum and 
the school district’s prohibition was an unconstitutional violation 
of Deeper Life’s free speech right.98 Rather, its decision was solely 
because the school district had previously allowed Deeper Life and 
other religious organizations to use school facilities.99 
Notwithstanding the history of permitting the use of school 
facilities by religious organizations, the Second Circuit would have 
                                                          
94 Id. at 678-79; N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414. See supra Part I.A (discussing that 
subparagraph (d) refers to commercial activities, regardless of the nature of the 
hosting organization, whose proceeds are applied to serve the purposes other 
than educational or charitable purposes). 
95 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 679. 
96 Id. The Widmar Court found that a state university had established an 
open forum when it made its facilities generally available for expressive 
activities. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 267-70. The Court held that the university’s 
policy to ban a type of expressive activity, i.e., religious worship or religious 
teaching, did not satisfy a constitutional requirement of a strict scrutiny 
standard. Id. Thus, the Court upheld the lower court’s decision that the 
university’s restriction constituted an unconstitutional discrimination against 
religious speech and that no Establishment Clause defense justified the 
restriction. Id. at 277. See supra note 84 (describing further the holding of 
Widmar). 
97 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 679. See Brief of the 
Amici Curiae the Northstar Legal Center and Bronx Household of Faith in 
Support of Petitioners at 8, Good News Club v. Mildford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 
98 (2001) (No. 99-2036); Brief of Liberty Counsel as Amicus Curiae in Support 
of Petitioner at 18-19, Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 
(2001) (No. 99-2036). 
98 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 680-81. 
99 Id. 
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otherwise easily reversed the injunction.100 
The Second Circuit determined that Widmar did not control 
because public elementary schools did not possess forum 
characteristics similar to a state university, even though the school 
district created the forum generally open to district residents for 
expressive activities.101 Instead, the court found that section 414 
created a limited forum and concluded that the state could exclude 
Deeper Life’s religious instruction, worship, and fundraising 
activities without strict scrutiny of the exclusion of private 
speech.102 The court further stated that “property remains a 
nonpublic forum as to all unspecified uses . . . and exclusion of 
uses—even if based upon subject matter or the speaker’s 
identity—need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral to pass 
constitutional muster.”103 Examining the activities of Deeper Life, 
the court determined that the church’s activities were not for the 
welfare of the community but for the church’s own benefit.104 
Finding the church’s activities too self-benefiting to constitute 
“other uses pertaining to the welfare of the community” under 
                                                          
100 Id. at 680. 
101 Id. at 679. See supra note 84 (describing further the holding of Widmar). 
The Second Circuit found that the intended users of the public forum created on 
the public elementary school facilities were limited to the citizens residing 
within a school district whereas the intended users of the public forum created 
on the university facilities were a general community. Deeper Life Christian 
Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 679. The Second Circuit found Widmar irrelevant with a 
minimal distinction that public elementary schools have less broad users than 
state universities. Id. 
102 Id. at 680-81. 
103 Id. at 679-80. This statement has been explicitly criticized by the 
Supreme Court. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 
U.S. 384, 393 (1993). See infra Part III.C (discussing the improper standard 
created by the Second Circuit). 
104 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 680 (referring to 
activities such as increasing membership and raising money to renovate the 
church building). Contra Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 
105 (2001) (finding that a community-based Christian youth organization’s 
meetings which consisted of singing praise songs, listening to Bible lessons and 
memorizing verses of scripture, pertain to the welfare of the community); infra 
note 180 and accompanying text. 
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section 414, it concluded that the activities were unprotected 
speech and undeserving of constitutional protection on the school 
premises.105 
B.  Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School 
District 
In 1988, Lamb’s Chapel, an evangelical Christian church, 
applied to the Center Moriches Union Free School District Board 
to use the high school auditorium for an evening for each of five 
weeks to show a film series.106 The film series portrayed family 
values and child rearing from a Christian perspective.107 The 
school district denied the application on the ground that allowing 
the use of school facilities for such purposes would violate section 
414 and Rule No. 7 of the School District’s Rules and Regulations 
for Community Use of School Facilities (“Rule No. 7”).108 In 
1990, Lamb’s Chapel brought an action against the school district 
for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the denial of the 
permit to show the film series violated the church’s free speech 
right.109 The district court denied the plaintiff’s request for a 
preliminary injunction and Lamb’s Chapel appealed to the Second 
                                                          
105 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 680. 
106 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 770 F. Supp. 91, 
92 (E.D.N.Y. 1991), aff’d, 959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 
(1993). 
107 Id. at 92 n.1. 
108 Id. at 93-94. 
Rule No. 7 provides that [t]he school premises shall not be used by any 
group for religious purposes. The Rules and Regulations further 
provide that groups requesting to use the school facilities must be 
composed predominantly of residents and/or students from the school 
community, although an exception is made for outside not-for-profit 
organizations, but only if the applicant demonstrates that there is a 
benefit to the school community. 
RULE NO. 7, cited in, Lamb’s Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 93 n.3 (citation omitted). 
See also statute cited supra note 21 and accompanying text Part I.A. 
109 Lamb’s Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 92. 
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Circuit.110 The appeal was withdrawn and the case was returned to 
the district court to reconsider in light of Board of Education of the 
Westside Community Schools v. Mergens.111 
The district court held that the facilities were properly barred to 
the plaintiffs since the intended use was not required under the 
New York Education Law and the school district’s own local 
rule.112 It also found no constitutional free speech right for 
religious groups on the school premises since similar speech had 
not been permitted there in the past.113 Analyzing Mergens, the 
district court factually distinguished Lamb’s Chapel’s case on the 
ground that the Mergens decision did not mandate the school 
district to “open its forum to [religious] use in the face of a policy, 
practice and in New York a state legislative enactment which 
specifically prohibits such use.”114 The district court determined 
that the school was a limited public forum because the school 
district—pursuant to state law and the district’s Rule No. 7, 
forbidding use “by any group for religious purposes”—did not 
permit groups similar to Lamb’s Chapel to use school facilities.115 
The district court found in fact that the school district had always 
                                                          
110 Id. 
111 Id. (explaining that the case was returned at the suggestion of the Staff 
Counsel for the Second Circuit for final disposition). See Bd. of Educ. of 
Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). In Mergens, a group of 
high school students were denied permission to establish a Christian club that 
meets on school premises after hours by the school board. It asserted that the 
club would violate the Establishment Clause. Id. The students alleged that 
refusal to permit their club to meet at school violated the Equal Access Act, 
which prohibits public schools receiving federal assistance and that maintain a 
“limited open forum” from denying “equal access” to students who want to meet 
“within the forum” on the basis of “religious, political, philosophical, or their 
content” of the speech at such meetings. Id. In reversing the district court’s 
judgment for the school board, the Court of Appeals held that “the Act applied 
to forbid discrimination against respondents’ proposed club on the basis of its 
religious content, and that the Act did not violate the Establishment Clause.” Id. 
The Supreme Court affirmed the decision. Id. at 247, 258. 
112 Lamb’s Chapel, 770 F. Supp. at 98. 
113 Id. 
114 Id. at 96. 
115 Id. at 99. 
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prohibited religious activities.116 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision.117 It held that there was no First Amendment violation in 
the school district’s denial of access because section 414 did not 
authorize the school district to permit religious uses of the school 
facilities.118 The Second Circuit found the list in section 414 
exclusive and that religious use is “nowhere permitted in [the] 
enumeration.”119 Thus, the Second Circuit concluded that the 
school district’s Rule No. 7 forbidding the use “by any group for 
religious purposes,” complied with state law.120 
Finding that school facilities were limited forums not open to 
religious uses by policy or practice, the Second Circuit applied the 
public forum doctrine to examine the constitutionality of the 
exclusion.121 Although the Second Circuit recognized that the strict 
scrutiny standard applicable to a traditional public forum applied to 
both “limited” and “designated” public forums, it followed Deeper 
Life’s more lenient standard in a limited public forum, which 
merely requires that the restriction based on subject matter or the 
speaker’s identity be reasonable for unspecified uses.122 When the 
appellants challenged the use of the more lenient standard as an 
improper interpretation of Supreme Court precedent, the Second 
Circuit referred to its own precedents, Deeper Life and Travis v. 
Owego-Apalachin School District, without reference to Supreme 
Court precedent, to bar the challenge.123 
                                                          
116 Id. at 98. This fact was found even though the Lamb’s Chapel presented 
a list of religious organizations that had used the school facilities. Id. at 94 n.4. 
117 Lamb’s Chapel, 959 F.2d at 389. 
118 Id. at 387-89. 
119 Id. at 386-87. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 388. 
122 Id. at 387 (citing Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of 
N.Y., 852 F.2d 676, 679-80 (2d Cir. 1988)). 
123 Lamb’s Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387. See Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. 
Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1991). In Travis, the Second Circuit held that 
“[i]n a limited public forum, government is free to impose a blanket exclusion 
on certain types of speech, but once it allows expressive activities of a certain 
genre, it may not selectively deny access for other activities of that genre.” Id. at 
LEE.DOC 3/3/2004  2:37 PM 
 ENSURING FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC FORUMS 451 
The Second Circuit found that none of the prior uses of the 
school facilities were religious when Lamb’s Chapel pointed out 
that the school allowed other organizations, such as the Salvation 
Army Youth Band, a “New Age” religious group known as the 
“Mind Center”, the Southern Harmonize Gospel Singers, and 
Hampton Council of Churches’ Billy Taylor Concert to use the 
same space.124 It stated that a program with an occasional use of 
religious terms or religious figures would not have religious 
purposes whereas a program with religious themes or a religious 
context would.125 
The Supreme Court reversed the Second Circuit’s decision and 
held that the Free Speech Clause was violated when the church 
was denied access to a school facility to publicly show a film series 
involving contemporary family and child-rearing issues.126 The 
Supreme Court stated, “There is no question that the district, like 
the private owner of property, may legally preserve the property 
under its control for the use to which it is dedicated.”127 On the 
other hand, the Court recognized that since the school district 
opened school facilities for two of the purposes under the state law, 
there was “considerable force” in the argument that the district 
                                                          
692. The Second Circuit dismissed the contention that its decisions were 
incompatible with Supreme Court precedent as “baseless.” Lamb’s Chapel, 959 
F.2d at 388. 
124 Lamb’s Chapel, 959 F.2d at 388. 
125 Id. 
126 Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 389-94. 
127 Id. at 390-91 (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. 
Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 800 (1985)); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); U.S. Postal Serv. v. Council of 
Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns., 453 U.S. 114, 129-30 (1981) (finding that a federal 
statute which prohibited unstamped mailable matter from being deposited in a 
mailbox was not a First Amendment issue because the prohibition was not 
regarding the content of the matter in the mailbox); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 
828, 836 (1976) (holding that there is no right in the Constitution to speak 
publicly or distribute leaflets on a military reservation); Adderley v. Florida, 385 
U.S. 39, 47 (1966) (holding that students’ rights of freedom of speech, press, 
assembly, and petition were not violated when, after several warnings, they were 
arrested for blocking the jail driveway while protesting prior arrests and city 
segregation policies). 
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should be “subject to the same constitutional limitations as 
restrictions in traditional public forums such as parks and 
sidewalks.”128 Applying the principle that the First Amendment 
prohibits governmental regulation of speech to suppress some 
viewpoints or ideas, the Court disagreed with the Second Circuit’s 
analysis that “the total ban on using district property for religious 
purposes could survive a First Amendment challenge only if 
excluding this category of speech was reasonable and viewpoint 
neutral.”129 Instead, the Court found that the film series exhibition 
dealt with a subject matter that was permissible under the school 
policy, and “its exhibition was denied access solely because the 
series dealt with the subject from a religious standpoint.”130 
C.  Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the University of 
Virginia 
In 1995, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to deal with a 
challenge to a university’s denial of funding to an on-campus 
organization.131 The University of Virginia had initiated a program 
to support students’ extracurricular campus activities.132 According 
to university guidelines, student groups could apply for financial 
support if their activities were not religious.133 The guidelines 
                                                          
128 Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391. 
129 Id. at 393. See City Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 804 (1984) (affirming the general principle that “the First Amendment 
forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints or 
ideas at the expense of others”). “[T]here are some purported interests—such as 
a desire to suppress support for a minority party or an unpopular cause, or to 
exclude the expression of certain points of view from the marketplace of ideas—
that are so illegitimate that they would immediately invalidate the rule.” Id. 
130 Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394. 
131 Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 
823 (1995). 
132 Id. at 823-24. The program included two methods: (1) by allowing any 
group with Contracted Independent Organization (“CIO”) status, which 
comprises the majority of its membership with students and follows certain 
procedural rules, access to the university facilities and (2) by permitting some 
CIO groups to apply for funds from the Student Activities Fund (“SAF”). Id. 
133 Id. at 825. Prohibited activities include “religious activities, 
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defined religious activities “as any activity that ‘primarily 
promotes or manifests a particular belie[f] in or about a deity or an 
ultimate reality.’”134 
Petitioner Rosenberger formed an organization, Wide Awake 
Productions (“WAP”), whose purpose was publishing “a magazine 
of philosophical and religious expression, facilitat[ing] discussion 
foster[ing] an atmosphere of sensitivity to and tolerance of 
Christian viewpoints and provid[ing] a unifying focus for 
Christians of multicultural backgrounds.”135 WAP obtained status 
as a student group and requested funds to cover its publication’s 
printing costs.136 The university denied the application on the 
ground that the WAP publication fit its definition of religious 
activities.137 WAP filed a suit claiming that the university’s refusal 
to fund the publication was based solely on the religious editorial 
viewpoint, and that the refusal violated WAP’s freedom of 
speech.138 
The district court held for the university on the ground that the 
university’s Establishment Clause concern over WAP’s activities 
sufficiently justified the denial of funding support.139 On appeal, 
the Fourth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.140 Despite 
the finding that the university guidelines were content-based 
speech discrimination against WAP, the Fourth Circuit still held 
that the Establishment Clause concern was a compelling state 
                                                          
philanthropic contributions and activities, political activities, activities that 
would jeopardize the University’s tax-exempt status, those which involve 
payment of honoraria or similar fees, or social entertainment or related 
expenses.” Id. 
134 Id. at 825 (citation omitted). 
135 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825-26 (citation omitted). In its first few 
publications, WAP featured articles and stories about racism, homosexuality, 
crisis pregnancy, stress, eating disorder, Christian missionary work, music 
reviews, and interviews with professors. Id. 
136 Id. at 826-27. 
137 Id. at 827. 
138 Id. 
139 Id. at 827-28. 
140 Id. at 828. 
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interest to justify the discrimination.141 
The Supreme Court held that the denial of funds was a 
violation of free speech.142 The Court recognized two dangers in 
the university’s regulation of private speech: it effectively 
authorized the state to examine the content of publications and 
resulted in the chilling of individual speech.143 The Supreme Court 
noted the distinction between “content discrimination, which may 
be permissible if it preserves the purposes of [a] limited forum, 
and . . . viewpoint discrimination, which is presumed 
impermissible when directed against speech otherwise within the 
forum’s limitations.”144 The Court recognized that the state is 
prohibited from exercising viewpoint discrimination in a limited 
public forum and that viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious 
form of content discrimination.”145 Therefore, the government 
must refrain from regulating speech when it cites the specific 
ideology or perspective of the speaker as justification for the 
regulation.146 Notwithstanding the university’s argument that the 
guidelines for determining a group’s eligibility for funding were 
not based on viewpoint, but on content, the Court concluded that 
                                                          
141 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828. 
142 Id. at 835-37. 
143 Id. at 834. 
144 Id. at 829-30. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641-
43 (1994) (distinguishing content-based discrimination, which favors or 
disfavors speech depending on the subject matter of the speech expressed 
therein, from content-neutral discrimination, which regulate speech regardless of 
the subject matter); City of Council of L.A. v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 
789, 804 (1984) (explaining the First Amendment precedent as forbidding the 
government from favoring some viewpoints or ideas about a permissible subject 
matter at the expense of others, absent a significant and legitimate state interest). 
145 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-31. See Turner, 512 U.S. at 641-43; 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 
(1993); R.A.V. v. St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 391 (1992) (holding that the city 
ordinance, banning display of symbols including burning cross was facially 
invalid under the First Amendment); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). Although SAF is a metaphysical 
forum rather than a physical forum, the Court found that it is governed by the 
same principle as a limited public forum. Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. 
146 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828-34. 
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the university excluded “religion not as a subject matter but 
select[ed] for disfavored treatment those student journalistic efforts 
with religious editorial viewpoints.”147 The Court also emphasized 
that even though the state is not required to subsidize an 
individual’s exercise of free speech, the state must maintain a 
viewpoint-neutral position.148 
D.  Good News Club v. Milford Central School 
In 1996, the Good News Club (“Club”), a community-based 
Christian youth organization, applied to use the Milford Central 
School facilities to hold weekly meetings.149 The meetings 
consisted of singing praise songs, listening to Bible lessons and 
memorizing verses of scripture.150 Finding that the proposed use by 
                                                          
147 Id. at 830-31. SAF denied WAP’s request for the funding because the 
publication “promote[d] or manifest[ed] a particular belie[f] in or about a deity 
or an ultimate reality.” Id. at 827 (citation omitted). 
148 Id. at 834. The Court noted that a university has authority to make 
academic judgments when allocating resources. Id. at 833. This is because the 
speaker is the state itself. Id. The state, however, may not regulate content when 
the speaker is a private individual. Id. at 834. 
149 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 149 
(N.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
150 Id. at 154. Milford requested information from the club to clarify the 
nature of the Club’s activities. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 
502, 507 (2d Cir. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). The Club sent a set of 
materials used and distributed at the meetings with the following description of 
its activities attached: 
The Club opens its session with Ms. Fourier taking attendance. As she 
calls a child’s name, if the child recites a Bible verse the child receives 
a treat. After attendance, the Club sings songs. Next[,] Club members 
engage in games that involve, inter alia, learning Bible verses. Ms. 
Fournier then relates a Bible story and explains how it applies to Club 
members’ lives. The Club closes with prayer. Finally, Ms. Fournier 
distributes treats and the Bible verses for memorization. 
Id. From the given materials, McGruder and Milford’s attorney concluded that 
the kinds of activities proposed by the Good News Club could not be 
characterized as “a discussion of secular subjects such as child rearing, 
development of character and development of morals from a religious 
perspective, but were in fact the equivalent of religious instruction itself.” Id. 
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the Club was “the equivalent of religious worship . . . rather than 
the expression of religious views or values on a secular subject 
matter,” the Milford school board denied the Club’s request based 
on its “Community Use School Facilities Policy” (“Community 
Use Policy”).151 In 1997, the Club brought a claim against the 
school district alleging that Milford’s denial of its application 
violated the Club’s free speech rights.152 
In April 1997, the district court granted a preliminary 
injunction, allowing the Club to hold its weekly meetings in the 
school during after-school hours.153 However, in October 1998, the 
district court vacated the injunction and granted Milford Central 
School’s motion for summary judgment.154 The district court 
upheld the school district’s denial on the ground that the subject 
matter of the Club’s activities “is decidedly religious in nature, and 
not merely a discussion of secular matters from a religious 
perspective that is otherwise permitted under the District’s use 
policies.”155 Explicit in the district court’s judgment are the notions 
that state law allows public use of school facilities only for 
specifically enumerated purposes, and that religious activities, 
including religious worship, instruction and fundraising, are not 
permitted purposes.156 The district court also concluded that the 
                                                          
151 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 149 n.3. The Community Use Policy 
states “school facilities may be used by district residents for holding social, civic 
and recreational meetings and entertainment events and other uses pertaining to 
the welfare of the community, provided that such uses shall be nonexclusive and 
shall be open to the general public.” Id. at 150. The district court concluded it to 
be “consistent with all applicable state law.” Id. See Community Use Policy, 
supra note 37; supra Part I.A.; infra Part III.D (discussing unconstitutionality of 
Community Use Policy). 
152 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 150. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2003). 
153 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 150. 
154 Id. at 161. 
155 Id. at 154. 
156 Id. at 158. The district court found that the state law “evidences the 
intent of the legislature to create a limited public forum in its public schools by 
permitting use of public school buildings by the general public for specific 
purposes.” Id. at 152. The district court further concluded that “Notably, 
religious worship, instruction, and fundraising is not among these enumerated 
purposes.” Id. See also N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002); supra Part 
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school district complied with the requirements of section 414 of 
the Education law in adopting the Community Use Policy.157 
Both parties agreed that the Milford Central School was a 
limited public forum.158 The district court properly defined the 
forum and the applicable strict scrutiny standard.159 Nevertheless, 
the standard the court actually applied was a rational basis 
standard.160 The district court recognized that the school is open to 
various community groups, such as Boy Scouts, Girl Scouts, and 
the 4-H Club.161 However, it found that these groups’ activities 
were a different type of secular subject matter than that of the 
Club, and thus concluded that the school district’s denial of access 
based on the general subject matter was reasonable.162 After 
                                                          
I.A (discussing New York Education Law § 414). 
157 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 152, 154. 
158 Id. at 153. 
159 Id. “Limited public forums are ‘created by government designation of a 
place or channel of communication for use by the public at large for assembly 
and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discussion of certain 
subjects.’” Id. (quoting Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, 
Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985)). “When a state opens a forum to the general 
public, the state is “bound by the same standards as apply in a traditional public 
forum.” Id. (quoting Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 
U.S. 37, 46 (1983)). “Accordingly, while the First Amendment permits 
reasonable time, place, and manner regulations, it forbids the state to enforce 
content-based exclusions unless narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state 
interest.” Id. (quoting Travis v. Owego-Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688, 692 
(1991)). 
160 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 153-54. “[C]ontent-based 
limitations are permissible to the extent that they preserve the purposes of the 
limited forum and are viewpoint neutral.” Id. at 153. This is not the standard of 
review delineated in Perry that requires the state restriction on private speech in 
a limited (or designated) public forum to be reasonable in its “time, place, and 
manner” for content-neutral restrictions or to prove a compelling state interest 
for content-based restrictions. See supra Part I.B.1 for the public forum analysis 
and the proper standard of review. 
161 Good News Club, 21 F. Supp. 2d at 158-59. 
162 Id. at 158-60. 
The Boy Scouts is designed to provide “effective character, citizenship, 
and personal fitness training” for children . . . . While the Boy Scouts 
teach reverence and a duty to God, it is only a part of its overall 
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scrutinizing the content of the Club’s speech, the court 
distinguished Lamb’s Chapel on the ground that “Good News is a 
religious youth organization whose proposed use [of the facility] 
deals specifically with religious subject matter—and not, as 
plaintiffs contend, merely a religious perspective on secular subject 
matter.”163 
In 2000, a divided panel of the Second Circuit affirmed the 
district court’s decision.164 First, the court held that Milford 
Central School’s prohibition on religious instruction in its facilities 
was not unreasonable because it would be proper for Milford to 
avoid its identification with a particular religion.165 Second, it held 
that Milford’s exclusion of the Club was constitutional subject 
discrimination.166 The court found that the Club’s activities were 
unprotected speech and that “for those who seek to speak on a 
topic or in a manner not contemplated by the public entity in 
opening the limited public forum ‘there is no fundamental right of 
freedom of speech.’”167 After considering the Club’s activities, the 
court held that the exclusion was not viewpoint discrimination 
because the “quintessentially religious” subject matter of the 
Club’s activities fell outside of the limited purpose of the forum 
and the Club’s activities did not constitute purely moral and 
character development.168 
                                                          
purpose which is the personal growth and development of leadership 
skills . . . . The purpose of the Girl Scouts “is to inspire girls with the 
highest ideals of character, conduct, patriotism, and service [so] that 
they may become happy and resourceful citizens.” . . . The Girl Scouts 
are “based on ethical values . . . .” The 4-H Club is a youth organization 
whose purpose is to “enable youth to develop knowledge, skills, 
abilities, attitudes, and behaviors to be competent, caring adults.” 
Id. 
163 Id. at 160. The Lamb’s Chapel Court determined that a religious film 
series could not be barred from school. Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 389-94 (1993). 
164 Good News Club, 202 F.3d 502. 
165 Id. at 510-11. 
166 Id. at 508-11. 
167 Id. at 510, 514 (citing Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 
10, 127 F.3d 207, 217 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
168 Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 510-11. 
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In dissent, Judge Jacobs criticized the majority’s application of 
the standard of review for regulations that restrict speech in a 
limited public forum.169 He expressed his view that “when the 
subject matter is moral and character, it is quixotic to attempt to 
draw a distinction between religious viewpoints and religious 
subject matters.”170 Referring to Rosenberger, Judge Jacobs 
emphasized that the distinction between subject matter and 
viewpoint, especially where a religious viewpoint is in question, is 
delicate and dangerous partly because of the reference to a deity 
for answers to moral questions.171 He stated that the moral values 
shaped by a deity constitute a viewpoint even if answers to moral 
questions are expressed in religious terms and moral values 
expressed in religious activities.172 He noted that the Supreme 
Court has refused to create a separate speech category solely for 
religious speech but has recognized religious perspective as a 
viewpoint over a wide range of subject matters.173 
The Supreme Court held that Milford’s restriction violated the 
Club’s free speech rights, and that Milford’s Establishment Clause 
argument did not justify that violation.174 The Supreme Court 
criticized the Second Circuit’s divergence from Supreme Court 
                                                          
169 Id. at 512-15 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
170 Id. 
171 Id. at 514. 
172 Id. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 829 (1995). “[D]iscrimination against one set of views or ideas is but a 
subset or particular instance of the more general phenomenon of content 
discrimination. And, it must be acknowledged, the distinction is not a precise 
one.” Id. at 830-31. 
173 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
390-92 (1993); Good News/Good Sports Club v. Sch. Dist. of City of Ladue, 28 
F.3d 1501, 1506-07 (8th Cir. 1994) (following the Supreme Court precedent 
which rejects a separate speech category for religious speeches and instead 
recognizes religious perspectives as one of numerous viewpoints on a variety of 
secular matters). 
174 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 102 (2001). In 
2001, the Supreme Court decided a landmark free speech and public forum 
doctrine case. The Bronx Household of Faith v. The Board of Education of the 
City of New York, N.Y.L.J. July 1, 2002, at 36. See supra Part I.B (discussing 
the Establishment Clause). 
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jurisprudence: 
We find it remarkable that the Court of Appeals majority 
did not cite Lamb’s Chapel, despite its obvious relevance to 
the case. We do not necessarily expect a court of appeals to 
catalog every opinion that reverses one of its precedents. 
Nonetheless, this oversight is particularly incredible 
because the majority’s attention was directed to it at every 
turn.175 
Applying Lamb’s Chapel, the Court first found that the school 
district’s exclusion of the Club constituted viewpoint 
discrimination with respect to the Club’s speech and thus violated 
the Free Speech Clause.176 The Court found the activities of 
Lamb’s Chapel and those of the Club indistinguishable, with only 
an inconsequential difference in mode of speech and concluded 
that both activities employ a religious viewpoint to teach morals 
and character.177 Because the school district in Good News Club 
opened its facilities to any “us[e] pertaining to the welfare of the 
community,” the Court found that the Club’s activities met the 
purpose of the limited public forum.178 The Court further found 
                                                          
175 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109 n.3. On the other hand, Judge Jacobs 
of the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was correct when he concluded 
that the school’s restriction constituted viewpoint discrimination under Lamb’s 
Chapel. Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 511-14 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
176 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109. The Court began its analysis based 
on the premise that the school is a limited public forum. Id. 
177 Id. at 109-10; Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
959 F.2d 381, 388-89 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). The Lamb’s 
Chapel delivered moral lessons through films and a lecture series whereas the 
Good News Club did so through a live storytelling and prayer. Id. See Cornelius 
v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 806 (1985). 
178 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 108-09. 
In short, any group that “promotes the moral and character 
development of children” is eligible to use the school building [under 
Milford’s policy]. Just as there is no question that teaching morals and 
character development to children is a permissible purpose under 
Milford’s policy, it is clear that the Club teaches morals and character 
development to children. For example, no one disputes that the Club 
instructs children to overcome feelings of jealousy, to treat others well 
regardless of how they treat the children, and to be obedient, even if it 
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that the Club’s activities are not “any more ‘religious’ or deserve 
any less First Amendment protection than did the publication of 
Wide Awake in Rosenberger.”179 Agreeing with Judge Jacobs’ 
dissent, the Court pointed out that for the purposes of the Free 
Speech Clause, there is “no logical difference in kind between the 
invocation of Christianity by the Club and the invocation of 
teamwork, loyalty, or patriotism” by other groups such as the Boys 
Scouts.180 
The school district argued that even if its restriction constituted 
viewpoint discrimination, the Establishment Clause compelled the 
school district to exclude religious instruction and justified 
content-based discrimination.181 The Court, however, found that 
the school had no valid Establishment Clause interest.182 That is, 
the Establishment Clause cannot be used to justify exclusion of 
religious groups from public school facilities.183 The Court 
                                                          
does so in a nonsecular way. 
Id. at 108 (citation omitted). Justice Scalia in his concurring opinion asserted 
that shaping the character development of children “pertains to the welfare of 
the community.” Id. at 124 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
179 Id. at 110. See Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 
515 U.S. 819 (1995); supra note 135 (discussing the details of the publication of 
Wide Awake). 
180 Id. at 111. See Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 512-15 (Jacobs, J., 
dissenting). The Supreme Court further pointed out that “[i]t is apparent that the 
unstated principle of the Court of Appeals’ [for the Second Circuit] reasoning is 
its conclusion that any time religious instruction and prayer are used to discuss 
morals and character, the discussion is simply not a ‘pure’ discussion of those 
issues.” See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111. 
181 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 112-13. 
182 Id. at 113. 
[Here, plaintiff’s] Establishment Clause defense fares no better. As in 
Lamb’s Chapel, the Club’s meetings were held after school hours, not 
sponsored by the school, and open to any students who obtained 
parental consent, not just to Club members. As in Widmar, Milford 
made it forum available to other organizations. The Club’s activities are 
materially indistinguishable from those in Lamb’s Chapel or Widmar. 
Thus, Milford’s reliance on the Establishment Clause is unavailing. 
Id. 
183 Id. See Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 
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concluded that allowing the Club access “to speak on school 
grounds would ensure neutrality, not threaten it” because “[t]he 
Good News Club seeks nothing more than to be treated neutrally 
and given access to speak about the same topics as are other 
groups.”184 
In a concurring opinion, Justice Scalia agreed that the school 
district engaged in viewpoint discrimination.185 He further noted, 
though, that how the exclusion was characterized was not 
important because whether the discrimination was based on the 
speech’s viewpoint or subject matter, exclusion of speech only 
“because it’s religious” fails to meet First Amendment scrutiny.186 
Comparing the Supreme Court’s and Second Circuit’s free speech 
analyses, Justice Scalia pointed out that the courts’ disagreement 
was not “whether the Good News Club must be permitted to 
                                                          
250 (1990) (holding that public schools could not ban meetings of student 
religious clubs and that equal access cases should be decided on the basis of 
freedom of speech, not the Establishment Clause that the Second Circuit 
persistently has used); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding 
that equal access cases should be decided on the basis of freedom of speech, not 
the Establishment Clause); Roemer v. Maryland Pub. Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 
(1976) (holding that a Maryland statute authorizing aid in the form of an annual 
subsidy to colleges affiliated with the Roman Catholic Church did not violate 
the Establishment Clause when the colleges were not “pervasively sectarian” 
and the aid extended only to the “secular side”); Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 
(1973) (holding that a South Carolina statute authorizing a proposed financing 
transaction involving the issuing of revenue bonds benefiting a Baptist-
controlled college did not violate the Establishment Clause since the purpose of 
the statute was secular, did not have the effect of advancing or inhibiting 
religion and did not foster an entanglement with religion); Comm. for Pub. 
Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (holding that two of five amendments to 
the New York Education and Tax Laws violated the Establishment Clause on 
the basis that the propriety of a legislature’s purpose may not immunize from 
further scrutiny a law that either has a primary effect that advances religion or 
fosters further church-state entanglements). 
184 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 114. 
185 Id. at 122 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
186 Id. See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 
U.S. 788, 806 (1985). Even subject-matter discrimination must at least be 
“reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum.” Id., cited in Good 
News Club, 533 U.S. at 122 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
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present religious viewpoints on morals and character” in a limited 
public forum nor “whether some of the Club’s religious speech fell 
within the protection of Lamb’s Chapel.”187 The disagreement, 
rather, focused on the part of the Club’s activities “that are not 
‘purely’ ‘discussions’ of morality and character from a religious 
viewpoint.”188 Justice Scalia explained that the Court had 
invalidated a similar viewpoint restriction where a school district 
allowed the Boy Scouts to support their teaching of morally 
upright and clean lives by offering good reasons to do so.189 Here, 
on the other hand, the Club was not allowed to offer good reasons 
to foster morally upright clean lives, where its reasons were God’s 
will and desire, becoming a righteous person or imitating Jesus 
Christ.190 Noticing the inability of the Justices to categorize the 
activities of the Club, Justice Scalia reiterated that the Supreme 
Court has “previously rejected the attempt to distinguish worship 
from other religious speech, saying that ‘the distinction has [no] 
intelligible content,’ and further, no ‘relevance’ to the 
constitutional issue.”191 He noted, in conclusion, that even if the 
                                                          
187 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 122 (Scalia, J. concurring). This is 
because the answer to both of these questions must be yes. Id. 
188 Id. at 123-24 (Scalia, J., concurring). Those reasons were the parents’ 
will and desire, becoming a more successful person or imitation of admired past 
Scouts. Id. These activities are that the Club encourages the participating 
Christian children to pray to God for the strength and the desire to obey Him, 
and the participating non-Christian children to believe that the Lord Jesus is 
their Savior. Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 156 
(N.D.N.Y. 1998), aff’d, 202 F.3d 502 (2d Cir. 2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
189 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 124 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 126. See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981) 
(rejecting the dissent’s attempt to distinguish between protected and unprotected 
religious speech because the distinction is unintelligible, irrelevant and likely 
beyond judicial competence to draw); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 
109 (1943) (refusing to distinguish evangelism from worship). It is important to 
note the inability to categorize the activities of the Good News Club. This 
inability reflects problems in allowing characterization of speech to be used to 
exclude speech. For example, Justice Stevens categorized the activities of the 
Good News Club as speech “aimed principally at proselytizing or inculcating 
belief in a particular religious faith,” and Justice Souter called the activities of 
Good News Club “essentially an evangelical service of worship.” Good News 
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federal judiciary were competent in making determinations about 
theological activities, it would still require state monitoring of 
private religious speech with a degree of pervasiveness that the 
Court has previously found unacceptable.192 
E.  Bronx Household I and II 
In 1995, the Bronx Household of Faith (“Bronx Household”), 
an evangelical Christian church, brought a Free Speech Clause 
action  (“Bronx Household I”) challenging a school district’s 
denial of its application to rent space in the public school for 
meetings including religious worship.193 The school district argued 
that the restriction was permissible discrimination pursuant to its 
Community Use Policy and section 414.194 The district court 
denied the Bronx Household’s motion for summary judgment and 
held that the school district’s regulation was reasonable, in light of 
the legitimate state concern to “preserv[e] and prioritiz[e] access to 
the middle school primarily for educational purposes and, 
secondarily, for nonexclusive public and community activities.”195 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision.196 Finding the school a limited public forum, the Second 
Circuit held that it was reasonable for a state, by its policy and 
practice, to exclude a church from school facilities to “avoid the 
identification of a middle school with a particular church.”197 
Analyzing Lamb’s Chapel and Widmar, the Second Circuit 
conceded that worship, “the ultimate in speech from a religious 
viewpoint”, as well as religious instruction, are protected speech, 
                                                          
Club, 533 U.S. at 125-27. 
192 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 127. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 844-45 (1995); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 
269 n.6. 
193 Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 1996 WL 700915 
*1 (S.D.N.Y. 1996), aff’d, 127 F.3d 207 (2d Cir. 1997). 
194 Id. See supra Part I.A (language of the policy and the state law). 
195 Bronx Household of Faith, 1996 WL 700915, at *6. 
196 Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207 (2d 
Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 523 U.S. 1074 (1998). 
197 Id. at 214. 
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which cannot be prohibited in an open forum.198 Nonetheless, it 
found that the Bronx Household’s speech could be distinguished 
from other forms of speech from a religious perspective and 
therefore, could be prohibited because the school district had never 
permitted access for the purpose of worship and religious 
instruction.199 In 1998, the Supreme Court denied certiorari.200 
In 2001, the Bronx Household reapplied to rent the middle 
school in light of Good News Club.201 After the school district 
denied the application, the Bronx Household filed a suit (“Bronx 
Household II”) with the same complaint as Bronx Household I, 
claiming that the Good News Club decision, in effect, reversed the 
Second Circuit’s decision in Bronx Household I.202 The district 
court granted a permanent injunction for the Bronx Household and 
ordered the defendant school district to allow the Bronx Household 
to use the public school auditorium for religious worship.203 
Reviewing Bronx Household I and Good News Club, the district 
court held that plaintiffs met their burden for the grant of a 
preliminary injunction.204 It found that Good News Club controlled 
                                                          
198 Id. at 214-15. 
199 Id. 
200 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 523 U.S. 1074 
(1998). 
201 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401, 409 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003). See supra Part II.D 
(discussing Good News Club). 
202 Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 411. 
203 Id. at 401. 
204 Id. Plaintiffs demonstrated that they would suffer irreparable harm 
because exclusion from school facilities deprived them of free speech rights; 
demonstrated substantial likelihood of success on the claim that the school 
district’s denial of access to school facilities for religious worship violated their 
free speech rights; defendants lacked a compelling state interest to exclude 
plaintiffs from the school; and established substantial likelihood of success on 
the merits of their claim that the school district’s policy violated the 
Establishment Clause. Id. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 
98, 105 (2001); Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d 207. A preliminary 
injunction is granted if the party seeking the relief establishes two elements: the 
party seeking relief will suffer “irreparable harm” and the party seeking relief is 
likely to succeed on the merits to make them a fair ground for sufficiently 
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because the school constituted a limited public forum.205 It 
concluded that the Bronx Household had a substantial likelihood of 
success on its free speech claim because its activities did not 
constitute “mere religious worship” and addressed the same subject 
matter as activities previously permitted in the forum.206 The court 
also concluded that even if the activities were labeled worship and 
addressed a different subject, a distinction could not be made 
between viewpoint and content discrimination when the subject 
matter includes prayer, morals, character, the welfare of the 
community, and worship.207 Furthermore, even if a distinction 
could be made, the state should still not dissect speech for the 
purpose of restricting such speech.208 
On appeal, the Second Circuit affirmed the district court’s 
decision, acknowledging that there was no basis to distinguish the 
activities in Good News Club from the activities of the Bronx 
Household.209 It found that there was a substantial likelihood for 
the Bronx Household to successfully show that the school district’s 
exclusion policy was an unconstitutional violation of the Bronx 
Household’s free speech rights.210 Yet, it avoided the issues of 
whether a meaningful distinction could be made between worship 
and other kinds of religious speech since agreement with the 
district court’s determination would invalidate its own 
precedents.211 In addition, it did not explicitly reject the school 
                                                          
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for litigation 
and a balance of hardships tips decidedly in the favor of the party seeking relief. 
See Daily v. New York City Hous. Auth., 221 F. Supp. 2d 390 (E.D.N.Y. 2002); 
Lark v. Lacy, 43 F. Supp. 2d 449 (S.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated by 87 F. Supp. 2d 
251 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
205 Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 413. 
206 Id. 
207 Id. 
208 Id. at 423-25. “The [Supreme] Court specifically held that, in its 
assumed limited public forum, Milford could not prohibit activities that, while 
“quintessentially religious,” were not “mere religious worship, divorced from 
any teaching of moral values.” Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 111-12 & n.4. 
209 Bronx Household of Faith, 331 F.3d at 354. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. at 355. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
959 F.2d 381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Travis v. Owego-
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board’s Establishment Clause argument.212 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The Second Circuit recognized that regulation of speech in 
both a designated public forum and a limited public forum are 
subject to the same standard of review applied in a traditional 
public forum—strict scrutiny.213 Despite this holding, the court has 
applied a more lenient standard of review to a limited public 
forum.214 In both Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club, in which 
the Supreme Court reversed Second Circuit decisions, the Supreme 
Court still allowed the more lenient standard of review for a 
nonpublic forum to be applied to a limited public forum.215 The 
Supreme Court’s vagueness leads to a categorization of the school 
districts’ exclusionary policy and practice that distinguishes 
between unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination and possibly, 
constitutional content discrimination.216 There is no principled 
                                                          
Apalachin Sch. Dist., 927 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1991); Deeper Life Christian 
Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1988). 
212 Bronx Household of Faith, 331 F.3d at 356. 
213 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 
2000); Lamb’s Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387; Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 
21 F. Supp. 2d 147, 153-54 (N.D.N.Y. 1998). 
214 Compare Good News Club, 202 F.3d 502; Bronx Household of Faith, 
127 F.3d 207, Lamb’s Chapel, 959 F.2d 381, and Deeper Life Christian 
Fellowship, 852 F.2d 676, with Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 
U.S. 98 (2001), Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819 (1995), Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384 (1993), and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788 (1985). The Supreme Court also utilized the same forum analysis as in 
Perry. Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 44-47 
(1983). 
215 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. 98; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. 384. See 
Ronnie J. Fischer, Comment, “What’s in a Name?”: An Attempt to Resolve the 
“Analytic Ambiguity” of the Designated and Limited Public Fora, 107 DICK. L. 
REV. 639, 668-70 (2003) (identifying that the Second Circuit found the limited 
public forum under the umbrella of designated public forum but applied both 
strict scrutiny and rational basis standards of review depending on the speaker’s 
class). 
216 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 122 (Scalia, J., concurring); Good 
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basis, however, upon which to ascertain this distinction in 
analyzing the state’s exclusionary policy and practice of regulating 
private speech.217 The Supreme Court, unfortunately, allowed the 
categorization of exclusionary policy and practice for religious 
speech, whose distinction between subject matter and viewpoint is 
too thin to determine by employing the analysis of viewpoint 
discrimination separate from content discrimination.218 As a result, 
New York school boards’ exclusion of religious groups from 
school premises may continue to be tested under the improper 
standard of review. Moreover, the school boards may continue to 
use the improper standard, which is applicable only to a nonpublic 
forum, to exclude certain private speech on the ground that the 
Establishment Clause provides a reasonable state interest to “avoid 
the identification of a [public] school with a particular 
[religion].”219 Thus, the following approaches are recommended to 
resolve the recurring unconstitutional prohibition of religious 
groups from New York public schools. 
                                                          
News Club, 202 F.3d at 512-13 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). 
217 See Mawdsley, supra note 11, at 27. 
At the very least, Good News Club has blurred the distinction in 
Lamb’s Chapel between subject matter on one hand and viewpoint 
discrimination on the other; to the furtherest extent, the two concepts 
have merged. If viewpoints have been expanded to encompass any 
subject presented by any community group allowed access to public 
school facilities, then the two concepts, one could argue, represent a 
distinction without a difference. 
Id. 
218 See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 122 (Scalia, J., concurring); Good 
News Club, 202 F.3d at 512-13 (Jacobs, J., dissenting). See also Mawdsley, 
supra note 11, at 27. 
219 Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 214. See Bronx Household of 
Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of New York and Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 
F.3d 342, 356 (2d Cir. 2003) (adding that although the Supreme Court found no 
Establishment Clause concern in Good News Club to justify the school district’s 
exclusionary policy and practice, a school district may still find a justifying 
Establishment Clause interest to exclude a religious organization from the 
school facilities open to the general public if its activities can be distinguished 
from Good News Club or Bronx Household II). 
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A.  New York Education Law Section 414 Creates a 
Designated Public Forum in New York Public Schools 
The federal courts in New York have consistently held that 
section 414 creates a limited forum, allowing for the specific 
exclusion of religious groups, and have consistently rejected the 
claim that it was the state’s intent to create a designated public 
forum.220 Although in Lamb’s Chapel and Good News Club the 
Supreme Court found the lower courts’ holdings on the nature of 
the forum problematic, it did not reverse the lower courts’ holdings 
because the nature of the forum issue was not contested in the 
Supreme Court.221 
New York state law creates a designated public forum in New 
York public schools.222 Pursuant to the public forum doctrine, a 
nonpublic forum such as a public school becomes a designated 
public forum when “school authorities have ‘by policy or practice’ 
opened those facilities for ‘indiscriminate use by the general 
public’ . . . or by some segment of the public, such as student 
organizations.”223 Section 414 explicitly provides that community 
residents may use public school facilities for “social, civic and 
recreational meetings, entertainment events and other uses 
pertaining to the welfare of the community.”224 The statute also 
permits community groups to use public school facilities for 
instruction in any branch of education or learning, or as space for 
                                                          
220 See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.2d at 212-14; Lamb’s 
Chapel, 959 F.2d at 381. 
221 Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 391. The Supreme Court found the 
petitioner Lamb’s Chapel’s argument to have “considerable force” that the 
district should be “subject to the same constitutional limitations as restrictions in 
traditional public forums such as parks and sidewalks.” Id. However, the 
Supreme Court stated that it did not have to decide on the issue. Id. 
222 Brief of the Amici Curiae the Northstar Legal Center and Bronx 
Household of Faith in Support of Petitioners at 4, Good News Club v. Mildford 
Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (No. 99-2036). See supra Part I.A (discussing 
New York state statute). 
223 Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 267 (1988) (quoting 
Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). See 
supra Part I.B.1 (explaining the public forum doctrine). 
224 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002). 
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political meetings, civic forums and community centers.225 
Subsections (a) and (c) of section 414 were adopted to 
intentionally create public forums in school facilities.226 Contrary 
to the Second Circuit’s conclusion, the statutory language creates a 
forum broadly available to the community.227 
The Second Circuit generally supported its conclusion that 
section 414 creates only a limited forum with two arguments.228 
First, the statute does not explicitly include “religious speech” in 
its enumerated purposes.229 Second, the school districts’ policy 
explicitly excludes “religious service and instruction.”230 These 
arguments conflict with Supreme Court precedent, which 
concluded that a public university had created a public forum, 
where the exclusion of religious worship would constitute 
unconstitutional content-based discrimination of private speech.231 
                                                          
225 Id. 
226 This is reflected in the language of Community Use Policy. Community 
Use Policy, supra note 37. See supra Part I.A (discussing Community Use 
Policy). 
227 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 508 (2d Cir. 
2000), rev’d, 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 
No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 215 (2d Cir. 1997); Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. 
Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 1988). 
228 Good News Club, 202 F.3d at 508; Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d 
at 215; Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 858 F.2d at 680. 
229 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002). 
230 Id. 
231 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981) (holding that a public 
university had created a public forum for students by a policy that allowed 
“political, cultural, educational, social and recreational events”). See also Chess 
v. Widmar, 635 F.2d 1310, 1312 (8th Cir. 1980). The policy set forth in Widmar 
is similar to the language of section 414 of New York Education Law. N.Y. 
EDUC. LAW § 414.1(c)-(d), (f) (McKinney 2002); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 277. 
Other circuits have followed the Supreme Court ruling in Widmar that similar 
policies create public forums, not limited forums. The First Circuit held that the 
school district’s policy to open its facilities for meetings by youth groups, 
community, civic, and service organizations, government agencies, educational 
programs and cultural events create a public forum and thus the exclusion of a 
church is “censorship” and an “elementary violation” of the First Amendment. 
Grace Bible Fellowship v. Me. Sch. Admin. Dist. No. 5, 941 F.2d 45, 48 (1st 
Cir. 1991). The Third Circuit held that the school district’s policy to permit 
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The only distinction between a designated public forum and a 
limited public forum is the scope of the purpose for which the 
forum is open to the public.232 If the purpose is to open the forum 
for the expressive activity of the “general public,” a designated 
public forum is created.233 If the purpose is to open the forum for 
the expressive activity of a specific group, such as student groups, 
or for the expressive activity of a specific subject matter, such as 
recreational sports, a limited public forum is created.234 Similarly, 
when the school district adopts the language of the statute to open 
the forum for the expressive activities of “social, civic and 
recreational meetings, entertainments, and other uses pertaining to 
the welfare of the community,” then a designated public forum has 
been created.235 The statutory language does not limit the purpose 
of the forum to a specific group, nor to a specific subject matter.236 
In fact, religious teachings that are not divorced from morals and 
good character are related to the welfare of the community.237 The 
                                                          
meetings by civic groups, cultural activities, resident service organizations, adult 
education classes and labor unions creates a public forum and prohibiting 
community groups from using the public forum “for religious services, 
instruction and/or religious activities” is unconstitutional. Gregoire v. Centennial 
Sch. Dist., 907 F.2d 1366, 1372-73, 1378-79 (3rd Cir. 1990). The Fourth Circuit 
held that the school district’s policy to permit meetings by cultural, civic and 
educational groups as well as political organizations, create a public forum, and 
thus, it struck down the requirement that churches pay more to use the school 
facilities. Fairfax Covenant Church v. Fairfax County Sch. Bd., 17 F.3d 703, 
704 (4th Cir. 1994). The Fifth Circuit held that the public library’s policy 
meetings of a “civic, cultural or educational character” creates a public forum 
and thus exclusion of a woman’s prayer group was unconstitutional. Concerned 
Women for America v. Lafayette County and Oxford, Miss. Pub. Library, 883 
F.2d 32, 34 (5th Cir. 1989). 
232 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 
(1983). See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 802 (1985); see also general discussion of the public forum doctrine supra 
Part I.B.1; supra text accompanying note 70. 
233 Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. 
234 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. 
235 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414.1(c) (McKinney 2002) (emphasis added). 
236 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002). 
237 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 110-11 (2001). See 
Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 512 (Jacobs, J., 
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Supreme Court and the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York have recognized, for example, that the activities of the 
Good News Club and the Bronx Household pertain to the welfare 
of the community.238 
Even if section 414 creates a limited public forum, it still does 
not create a “religious-use free” limited public forum.239 In the face 
                                                          
dissenting). “In my view, when the subject matter is morals and character, it is 
quixotic to attempt a distinction between religious viewpoints and religious 
subject matters.” Id. For example, the activities of the Bronx Household 
included: 
The Sunday morning meeting [which] is the indispensable integration 
point for our church. It provides the theological framework to engage 
in activities that benefit the welfare of the community. Those who 
attend the Sunday morning meetings are taught to love their neighbors 
as themselves, to defend the weak and disenfranchised, and to help the 
poor regardless of their particular beliefs. It is a venue where people 
can come to talk about their particular problems and needs. Over the 
years we have helped people with basic needs such as food, clothing, 
and rent. We have also provided, by means of counseling, friendship 
and encouragement, help for people to get out of the multi-generational 
welfare cycle, to lead productive lives, to leave a life of crime and/or 
drugs to become responsible citizens, and to counsel people whose 
personal finances are out of control. In one recent case we helped an 
individual who was about to get evicted. Church members helped him 
budget his income in order to meet his primary expenses, get rid of his 
excessive credit card debt and pay off overdue taxes. He now has a 
savings account of almost $1000.00. It is through the Sunday meeting 
where we directly or indirectly learn of these situations and where we 
can converse with the individuals involved in order to monitor the 
progress of the issue to be resolved . . . . In years past, the church 
meeting was a very important place for Cambodian Refugees to come 
in order for us to get to know them so that we could help them with 
food, clothing and to help them get acclimated to American society. 
Most of them were Buddhists. 
Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401, 410 (S.D.N.Y. 
2002), aff’d, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003) (citing First Affidavit of Robert Hall, 
sworn to on Dec. 13, 2001, at 3-4, 7-9). 
238 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 110-11; Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. 
Supp. 2d at 422-24. 
239 Brief for Petitioners at 22, Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (No. 91-2024). 
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of the broad statutory language, the Second Circuit has held that 
the exclusion of one type of speech from a forum generally open to 
the public transforms the forum into a limited public forum.240 
According to the Supreme Court’s forum jurisprudence, however, 
a public forum is created when the government has opened a space 
to the public for purposes of expressive activity and designated that 
space for a limited purpose.241 The Supreme Court’s forum 
jurisprudence does not imply that a limited forum is created when 
a single type of speech is excluded from the general uses available 
in the forum. 
Pursuant to section 414, the purposes for which a forum is open 
can be limited, but the users within those limited purposes cannot 
be limited.242 Under the policy of opening a forum to student 
groups, the school district cannot select which student groups 
should be permitted to use the facilities.243 When a school district 
opens its forum to the public for the limited purpose of expressive 
activity “pertaining to the welfare of the community,” there is a 
requirement that “[such] uses shall be non-exclusive.”244 This 
                                                          
240 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 
387 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Deeper Life Christian 
Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676 (2d Cir. 1988). In Lamb’s 
Chapel, the Second Circuit held that the Center Moriches Union Free School 
was free to create a “limited public forum from which religious uses would be 
excluded.” Lamb’s Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387. See Brief of the Amici Curiae the 
Northstar Legal Center and Bronx Household of Faith in Support of Petitioners 
at 8, Good News Club v. Mildford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001) (No. 99-
2036). 
241 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45-46 
& n.7 (1983). 
242 See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414.1(c) (McKinney 2002) (“For holding social, 
civic and recreational meetings and entertainments, and other uses pertaining to 
the welfare of the community; but such meetings, entertainment and uses shall 
be non-exclusive and shall be open to the general public”) (emphasis added). 
The plain language of the statute requires the uses within the purpose of the 
forum to be non-exclusive. Id. 
243 The forum should be open to all student groups and the school district 
cannot use the policy as a disguise to deny, for example, a Jewish student group 
access to school facilities because it identifies the Jewish student group as a 
religious group rather than a student group. 
244 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414.1(c) (McKinney 2002). 
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requirement applies whether the forum is called a designated 
public forum or a limited public forum.245 Therefore, when the 
activities of religious groups pertain to the welfare of the 
community, the school district cannot use section 414 and its 
policy as a disguise to deny their access on the basis of their 
religious conviction or viewpoint.246 Contrary to the Second 
Circuit’s holding, there is no special subcategory of a “religious-
use free” public forum.247 
Administration of a “religious-use free” forum would require 
school officials and judges to screen private speech to determine 
how much of that speech has religious components to be excluded 
from the definition of “any uses pertaining to the welfare of the 
community.”248 Such discretion would require the kind of state 
monitoring of private religious speech that the Supreme Court has 
found unacceptable because the school district would be required 
to evaluate private speech, “discern [its] underlying assumptions 
respecting religious theory and belief” and make a determination 
whether that private speech is permissible discussion of religious 
material.249 To avoid such subjective monitoring, the school 
districts must concede that section 414 creates a designated public 
forum. They should also discontinue policies giving rise to a 
mutated forum that allows school facilities to be used exclusively 
for kinds of speech the school districts selectively consider to be 
                                                          
245 Id. 
246 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002). See, e.g., Good News Club v. 
Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of 
Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003). 
247 Brief for Petitioners at 22, Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (No. 91-2024). 
248 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414.1(c) (McKinney 2002). See, e.g., Good News 
Club, 533 U.S. at 122 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
249 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 127. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and 
Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 844-45 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 
U.S. 263, 269 n.6 (1981). Such broad discretion undoubtedly creates a risk of 
impermissible discrimination amongst religious groups as well as between 
religious and non-religious groups. Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion in 
Good News Club, pointed out this exact problem when he noted that the federal 
judiciary was not competent to make determinations about religious components 
of expressive activities. Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 127. 
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furthering the welfare of the community. 
B.  Limited Forum Must Be Redefined 
In public forum doctrine, “limited public forum” and 
“designated public forum” are synonymous.250 A public forum that 
is “created for a limited purpose such as use by certain groups [like 
students groups in Widmar] or for the discussion of certain subjects 
[like school board business]” is a designated forum, sometimes 
referred to as a limited public forum.251 The only practical 
difference between a designated public forum and a limited public 
forum is the scope of the purposes for which the forum is open to 
the public.252 
Public forum doctrine does not recognize a separate category 
of limited public forum.253 Yet, courts often cite a footnote in 
Perry for the proposition that a limited public forum exists as a 
                                                          
250 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 n.7 
(1983). See Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 
788, 802 (1985). 
251 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. 
252 Cf. Fischer, supra note 215, at 639-74 (claiming that often the outcome 
of a public forum doctrine case depends on the name of the public forum). 
Fischer’s claim corresponds to the solutions that this note recommends. The 
reason why “limited public forum” must be redefined is that the name means as 
much in the public forum doctrine analysis as Fischer argues. This note 
suggests, however, that it does not matter what the forum is called when the 
definition and the standard of review are misapplied among the courts and the 
experts. 
253 See Int’l Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672, 678 
(1992). A designated public forum is property that the government has opened 
for expressive activity by part or all of the public. Id. If the government excludes 
a private speaker who falls within the class to which a designated public forum 
is made available, its exclusionary action is subject to strict scrutiny. Id. “[T]he 
government does not create a [designated] public forum by inaction or by 
permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally opening a nontraditional 
public forum for public discourse.” Id. at 680. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 
U.S. 720, 726-27 (1990); Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 
460 U.S. 37 (1983); see also supra Part I.B.1 (discussing the public forum 
doctrine). 
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separate category.254 This footnote does not define a limited public 
forum, though; rather, it gives an example of the narrow purposes 
for which a designated public forum could be created.255 In the 
end, whether New York public schools are called designated or 
limited public forums is insignificant as long as strict scrutiny 
review is applied.256 
The Second Circuit has maintained that as long as the 
government creates a limited public forum, any restrictions placed 
on speech are presumed content-neutral and will “pass the 
constitutional muster” as long as they are reasonable.257 This 
                                                          
254 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46 n.7. “A public forum may be created for a limited 
purpose such as use by certain groups, e.g., (student groups), or for the 
discussion of certain subjects, e.g., (school board business).” Id. (citation 
omitted). 
255 Id. at 45-46. The Court defined forums as that which “the state has 
opened for use by the public as a place for expressive activity. The Constitution 
forbids a state to enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the 
public even if it was not required to create the forum in the first place.” Id. 
(citation omitted). The first reference to limited public forum is found in Deeper 
Life Christian Fellowship, which notes that “[u]nder the limited public forum 
analysis, property remains a nonpublic forum as to all unspecified uses.” Deeper 
Life Christian Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676, 679 (2d Cir. 
1988) (citing Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 
788, 802 (1985) and Perry, 460 U.S. at 48). However, the authority for this 
proposition explained that the government could elect to return a forum to a 
nonpublic status since the “government is not required to indefinitely retain the 
open character of the facilities.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802 (quoting Perry, 460 
U.S. at 48). 
256 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 122 (2001) 
(Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia noted: 
[S]ince we have rejected the only reason that respondent gave for 
excluding the Club’s speech from a forum that clearly included [such 
speech] (the forum was opened to any “use pertaining to the welfare of 
the community”), I do not suppose it matters whether the exclusion is 
characterized as viewpoint or subject-matter discrimination. Lacking 
any legitimate reason for excluding the Club’s speech from its forum–
”because it’s religious” will not do, respondent would seem to fail First 
Amendment scrutiny regardless of how its action is characterized. 
Id. (alteration in original). 
257 E.g., Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 679. 
LEE.DOC 3/3/2004  2:37 PM 
 ENSURING FREE SPEECH IN PUBLIC FORUMS 477 
reasoning ultimately stops the free speech analysis at the point of 
determining the kind of speech allowed in a forum without 
reaching the question of whether the restriction is justified to 
suppress private speech. The Second Circuit did not insist on the 
same reasoning in Bronx Household II.258 In Bronx Household II, 
the Second Circuit conceded to the Supreme Court’s free speech 
analysis in Good News Club, which reversed the judgment and the 
reasoning of the Second Circuit.259 The Second Circuit, however, 
“decline[d] to review the trial court’s further determinations that, 
after the Good News Club, religious worship cannot be treated as 
an inherently distinct type of activity” and left room for future 
disputes of free speech analysis.260 This is an important 
determination that the Second Circuit must make for the third-
prong of the free speech analysis in the future.261 Thus, as long as 
the name, limited forum, does not automatically lead to deficiency 
in free speech analysis, particularly for the third prong, its use is 
not objectionable.262 
C.  The “Reasonable and Viewpoint Neutral” Standard Should 
Apply to Nonpublic Forums only 
The state is subject to strict scrutiny when regulating private 
speech in traditional and designated public forums.263 The state 
may regulate the time, place and manner of private speech so long 
as the regulations “are content-neutral, are narrowly tailored to 
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample 
alternative channels of communication.”264 The state must show a 
                                                          
258 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Edu. of the City of New York and 
Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 F.3d 342, 351-54 (2d Cir. 2003). 
259 Id. 
260 Id. at 355. 
261 See supra text accompanying note 52. 
262 See discussion supra Part I.B.1. “The Constitution forbids a state to 
enforce certain exclusions from a forum generally open to the public even if it 
was not required to create the forum in the first place.” Perry Educ. Ass’n v. 
Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45 (1983). 
263 Perry, 460 U.S. at 45-46. 
264 Id. at 45. 
LEE.DOC 3/3/2004  2:37 PM 
478 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
compelling interest to regulate private speech based on its 
content.265 
Although the Second Circuit recognized that the traditional 
public forum standard applies to both “limited” or “designated” 
public forums, it distorted the standard applied in the limited 
public forum.266 The Second Circuit held that a limited public 
forum may “remain non-public except as to specified uses . . . , and 
exclusion of uses—even if based upon subject matter or the 
speaker’s identity—need only be reasonable and viewpoint-neutral 
to pass constitutional muster.”267 This holding is contrary to the 
standard set forth by the Supreme Court in Perry.268 In Lamb’s 
Chapel, the Supreme Court explicitly criticized the Second 
Circuit’s position.269 The Second Circuit applied the “reasonable 
and viewpoint neutral” standard again in Bronx Household I, even 
though the same state law and district policy in question in Lamb’s 
Chapel governed the school district.270 The Second Circuit applied 
the same standard yet again in Good News Club, finding no 
fundamental right of free speech “for those who seek to speak on a 
topic or in a manner not contemplated by” the school district.271 
Moreover, the school districts have utilized this lenient standard to 
justify their exclusionary policies on the ground that exclusion of 
unlisted content such as religious instruction is reasonable to 
preserve the intended purposes of the forum, where the purpose of 
                                                          
265 Id. 
266 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676, 
679-80 (2d Cir. 1988). See, e.g., Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free 
Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 387 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
267 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship, 852 F.2d at 679-80. See, e.g., Lamb’s 
Chapel, 959 F.2d at 387. 
268 See supra notes 68-74 and accompanying text. 
269 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 
393 (1993). The Supreme Court disagreed with the Second Circuit, which 
“appeared to recognize that the total ban on using District property for religious 
purposes could survive First Amendment challenge only if excluding this 
category of speech was reasonable and viewpoint neutral.” Id. 
270 Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 
214 (2d Cir. 1997). 
271 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 202 F.3d 502, 510 (2d Cir. 
2000). 
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the forum is to exclude religious instruction.272 They have also 
argued that the exclusionary policy is a reasonable, if not 
compelling, means to comply with the Establishment Clause.273 
The distortion of the standard of review for a limited public 
forum started in Deeper Life Christian Fellowship.274 The Second 
Circuit supported its conclusion that the reasonable and viewpoint 
neutral standard applies by citing the portion of the Cornelius v. 
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, Inc. decision where 
the Supreme Court was discussing the standard for “nonpublic 
forum.”275 The Supreme Court, however, is clear that the 
                                                          
272 See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing school district’s arguments). 
273 The government continues to argue that it has a strong interest to 
comply with the Establishment Clause to justify the exclusionary policy even 
though the Supreme Court has consistently struck down the Establishment 
Clause argument in free speech cases. See supra Part I.B.2. 
274 Deeper Life Christian Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676, 
680 (2d Cir. 1988). See supra text accompanying note 105. 
275 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788, 
806 (1985). The Cornelius Court held that the Combined Federal Campaign, a 
charity drive aimed at federal employees, to voluntary, tax-exempt, nonprofit 
charitable agencies that provide direct health and welfare services to individuals 
or their families, is a nonpublic forum and applied a more lenient 
“reasonableness” test to decide whether the exclusion was constitutional. Id. at 
805-06. Citing Perry, the Court affirmed its previous holding that the reasonable 
test should only be applied to nonpublic forum because controlling the access to 
a nonpublic forum, based on subject matter and the speaker’s identity is 
constitutional so long as the distinctions are reasonable in light of the purpose of 
the policy and are viewpoint neutral. Perry Educ. Ass’n. v. Perry Local 
Educators’ Ass’n., 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983), cited in Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. 
“Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions 
in access on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity. These distinctions 
may be impermissible in a public forum but are inherent and inescapable in the 
process of limiting a nonpublic forum to activities compatible with the intended 
purpose of the property.” Id. (emphasis added). The language of the Cornelius 
Court is noteworthy because it is the exact language that the Second Circuit has 
used to support its rationale for the standard of review for a limited public 
forum. Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 806. 
Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject 
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are 
reasonable in light of the purpose served by the forum and are 
viewpoint neutral. Although a speaker may be excluded from a 
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“reasonable and viewpoint neutral” standard applies only to 
nonpublic forums because private speech in a public forum, 
whether limited, designated or traditional, is protected from 
governmental regulation unless a compelling state interest 
outweighs the free speech interest.276 Referring to designated and 
limited forums, the Perry Court announced that “[a]lthough a state 
is not required to indefinitely retain the open character of the 
facility, as long as it does so it is bound by the same standards as 
apply in a traditional public forum.”277 Unless the Second Circuit 
holds that the reasonable and viewpoint neutral standard applies 
only to nonpublic forums, unconstitutional state regulation of 
private speech may continue to occur in school districts. 
One of the arguments school districts have made to justify their 
exclusionary practice is that state law allows it.278 The public 
forum doctrine, however, provides that when it makes its facilities 
available for expressive activities, the government may not 
selectively exclude users solely on the basis of the religious 
content of their speech.279 In spite of this, the Second Circuit has 
upheld the argument that state law allows exclusion of religious 
instruction.280 Thus, restriction on access to school facilities is 
                                                          
nonpublic forum if he wishes to address a topic not encompassed 
within the purpose of the forum, or if he is not a member of the class of 
speakers for whose especial benefit the forum was created, the 
government violates the First Amendment when it denies access to a 
speaker solely to suppress the point of view he espouses on an 
otherwise includible subject. 
Id. (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
276 See Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 677 
(1998); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educ. Fund, Inc. 473 U.S. 788, 
800 (1985); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
277 Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. 
278 See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying text. 
279 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). 
280 Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 
386-89 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Deeper Life Christian 
Fellowship v. Bd. of Educ. of N.Y., 852 F.2d 676, 679-81 (2d Cir. 1988). 
Although it has affirmed the lower court’s decision granting a local church 
access to a public school for religious worship in Bronx Household II, the 
Second Circuit ruled on the First Amendment analysis and failed to rule on the 
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facilitated by the lower federal courts’ refusal to strictly scrutinize 
school district policy and practice. 
New York state law gives school boards the authority to adopt 
a policy to create public forums, but this authority is not without 
limit.281 School boards are still bound by the Constitution when 
they attempt to regulate private speech.282 Until courts apply the 
heightened scrutiny standard, school districts are able to implement 
policy and practice that selectively violate religious groups’ free 
speech rights. 
D.  The Community Use Policy Should Be Struck Down As 
Facially Unconstitutional 
New York’s Community Use Policy is facially unconstitutional 
and should be struck down because it violates the First 
Amendment rights of religious groups by singling out religious 
speech from a public forum.283 The Community Use Policy draws 
a constitutionally flawed distinction between religious discussion, 
which it permits, and religious services and instruction, which it 
prohibits.284 The distinction stated in the Community Use Policy 
has resulted in decisions that have ultimately been reversed by the 
                                                          
state law argument. Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Edu. of the City of New 
York and Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 F.3d 342 (2003). 
281 N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 414 (McKinney 2002). 
282 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 107 (2001) 
(“Because we hold that the exclusion of the Club on the basis of its religious 
perspective constitutes unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination, it is no 
defense for Mildford that purely religious purposes can be excluded under state 
law.”). 
283 Standard Operating Procedures for Schools and FMCs, EDUC. Topic 5 
(October 2001, revised). See language of the policy supra note 37. 
284 Community Use Policy § 5.11. 
[N]o outside organization or group may be allowed to conduct religious 
services or religious instruction on school premises after school. 
However, the use of school premises by outside organizations or groups 
after school for the purpose of discussing religious material or material 
which contains a religious viewpoint or for distributing such material is 
permissible. 
Id. 
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Supreme Court.285 The distinction has also forced the courts to 
dissect the nature of religious groups’ speech.286 Although the 
Supreme Court held the school district’s exclusion policy against 
religious groups to be unconstitutional, New York school districts 
continue to rely on the Community Use Policy to violate religious 
groups’ free speech rights.287 For example, the Second Circuit in 
Bronx Household I allowed the school district to make a distinction 
to permit discussion of religious material and prohibit religious 
instruction.288 However, the district court in Bronx Household II 
properly struck down such practice because “the government may 
not, consistent with the First Amendment, engage in dissecting 
speech to determine whether it constitutes worship.”289 Thus, the 
Second Circuit should strike down the facially unconstitutional 
Community Use Policy and stop the school districts’ effort to 
single out private religious speech.290 
                                                          
285 Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb’s 
Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993). 
286 In Lamb’s Chapel, the Second Circuit drew a distinction between 
religious references in Lamb’s Chapel’s film about family issues, on the one 
hand, and a number of other uses that are arguably at least equally religious, on 
the other. Thus, the court below concluded: a Salvation Army Band concert, 
complete with invocation and rendition of “Jericho Revisited” and “God Bless 
America,” was not religious; a Gospel Music Concert, replete with religious 
songs and hymns, was not religious; and a lecture series on parapsychology, 
Kundalini (a Far Eastern concept), and spiritual growth, was not religious. 
Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 959 F.2d 381, 388 (2d 
Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union 
Free Sch. Dist., 736 F. Supp. 1247, 1252-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1990), aff’d, 959 F.2d 
381 (2d Cir. 1992), rev’d, 508 U.S. 384 (1993). See Ross Paine Masler, Tolling 
the Final Bell: Will Public School Doors Remain Open to the First 
Amendment?, 14 MISS. C. L. REV. 55, 64 n.54 (1993). 
287 Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 119; Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395. 
288 Bronx Household of Faith v. Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 127 F.3d 207, 
215 (2d Cir. 1997). See Mawdsley, supra note 11, at 28. 
289 Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ., 226 F. Supp. 2d 401, 423 
(S.D.N.Y. 2002), aff’d, 331 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2003) (holding consistently with 
the Supreme Court precedent). 
290 There are a few cases in which the Second Circuit discussed the 
Community Use Policy. See, e.g., Bronx Household of Faith v. Bd. of Educ. of 
the City of New York and Cmty. Sch. Dist. No. 10, 331 F.3d 342, 359 (2d Cir. 
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CONCLUSION 
Remarkable changes have taken place in the New York district 
court between Deeper Life Christian Fellowship and Bronx 
Household II. In Bronx Household II, the Southern District of New 
York recognized that religious worship is not a separate speech 
category, distinction between viewpoint discrimination and content 
discrimination is unattainable, and dissecting private speech for the 
purpose of restriction is unconstitutional.291 This is an accurate 
analysis of the Free Speech Clause and the public forum doctrine 
and a correction of the distorted application of the doctrine. This is 
also a proper recognition of how section 414 should be applied 
within the constitutional boundaries. Section 414 provides the 
                                                          
2003) (Miner, J. dissenting); Bronx Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 216. They 
show that the Second Circuit is uncertain whether the Community Use Policy is 
unconstitutional. In Bronx Household I, the majority concluded that the 
Community Use Policy “[did] not bar any particular religious practice” and 
“[did] not interfere in any way with the free exercise of religion by singling out 
a particular religion or imposing any disabilities on the basis of religion.” Bronx 
Household of Faith, 127 F.3d at 216. The Second Circuit discussed the 
Community Use Policy again in the dissenting opinion in Bronx Household II. 
Bronx Household of Faith, 331 F.3d at 359 (Miner, J. dissenting). The dissent, 
who wrote the majority opinion in Bronx Household I, argued that section 414 
manifested “the clear policy of the State of New York to bar religious activities 
from the public schools to the greatest extent possible” and the Community Use 
Policy, especially § 5.11, “conform[ed] to the purposes and intent” of the section 
414. Id. This is a misinterpretation of the Supreme Court precedent where such 
exclusion must be interpreted narrowly to avoid a violation of the First 
Amendment. See Good News Club, 533 U.S. at 109. The dissent in Bronx 
Household II misses the point that the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
land and every state must exercise its authority within the Constitutional 
limitation. Cf. Mawdsley, supra note 11, at 27 (offering analogous arguments 
for section 414, “Without having to declare these state provisions 
unconstitutional as violations of free speech, courts simply could determine that 
the federal constitution preempts state law and the state provisions do not apply 
where school districts have created limited public forums”). 
291 Bronx Household of Faith, 226 F. Supp. 2d at 418. The Supreme Court 
specifically held that, in its assumed limited public forum, Milford could not 
prohibit activities that, while “quintessentially religious,” were not “mere 
religious worship, divorced from any teaching of moral values.” Good News 
Club, 533 U.S. at 111-12 & n.4. 
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school boards the control and supervision over school facilities so 
that school facilities may continue to benefit the students and the 
community residents after school hours. It does not, however, 
provide the school boards unlimited power to discriminate against 
people with any religious views or to suppress the kinds of speech 
that they do not approve. Only when courts reshape the application 
of public forum doctrine and school boards recognize the 
constitutional limitation on their authority to regulate speech will 
the chilling effect on private speech stop in New York public 
school forums. 
 
